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CARBON OUTLASTS THE LAW: STATES 
WALK THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINE 
STEVEN FERREY* 
Abstract:  State carbon policies to control climate warming and our energy future 
are under legal attack. A successful barrage of litigation now invokes the dormant 
Commerce Clause and the Federal Power Act as interpreted through the Filed Rate 
Doctrine, as well as the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, to challenge 
the legal validity and sustainability of these state carbon-based laws. California and 
other states have survived these legal challenges sparingly, and then often only by 
prevailing with procedural defenses that dismiss the case before a decision on the 
legal merits of their state energy regulation. This Article examines and analyzes the 
multiple legal dimensions of challenges on carbon control and sustainable energy 
in a constellation of states, comparing them to California’s particular legal chal-
lenges. The Constitution is not changeable by simple legislation; its requirements 
and restrictions endure, and state action on energy can be ruled unconstitutional. 
The now-forming precedent will construct and limit the U.S. carbon-control future 
as states labor to achieve a legally sustainable economy. This Article navigates 
these recent challenges to state carbon control and sustainable energy statutory and 
regulatory law. How the judiciary is resolving each challenge, and the precedent 
created, will chart the future of U.S. sustainable energy policy.  
You will die but the carbon will not; its career does not end with you. 
—Jacob Bronowski 
I. CARBON-BASED LIFE FORMS 
Carbon will outlive us, but can current state climate change law and sus-
tainable energy regulation survive? State carbon policies to control climate 
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warming and our energy future are in legal jeopardy. In the void created by a 
lack of federal policy,1 California and ten states on the East Coast implemented 
new laws to reduce carbon emissions and promote sustainable energy. Since im-
plementation, a successful barrage of litigation has invoked the dormant Com-
merce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to challenge 
the legal viability of these laws. 
Although California was not the first state to impose carbon control law,2 it 
is now the epicenter of legal challenges. California is accused of taking ultra 
vires administrative actions not allowed under state law or the U.S. Constitution 
and illegally discriminating against interstate commerce.3 While carbon regula-
tion proceeds in California and in nine East Coast states,4 California is the only 
state to have adopted all five primary legal mechanisms for sustainable energy 
and low-carbon development:5 
• Net Metering: Also employed in 85% of states. 
• Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS): Also employed in 65% of states. 
• Renewable System Benefit Charges: Also employed in 33% of states. 
• Carbon and greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation: Also employed in 20% of 
states. 
• Feed-In Tariffs: Also employed in less than 10% of states. 
The states, particularly including California, are now legally challenged 
from multiple angles and have had some of their regulations declared unconstitu-
tional.6 The writing was on the wall.7 This Article examines these California le-
gal confrontations and compares them to what is transpiring in other states. No-
tably, it is not just the regulated community that has taken legal umbrage with 
the California sustainable energy program. California is also challenged by envi-
                                                                                                                           
 1 In the past decade, the only significant federal energy legislation, other than tax incentives, was 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA). See 42 U.S.C. § 15801; id. § 17071. EPAct is a relatively modest statute, though it did require 
net metering by the states, and has not been uniformly followed in every state. EISA largely dealt with 
fuels and appliance efficiency rather addressing electric industry operations. 
 2 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program on the East Coast began in 2009. 
California’s delayed Assembly Bill 32 began in 2013. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 25–163 and 243–300 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 72–200 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 396–397 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 112–200 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy 
and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
125, 125 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, FiT in the U.S.A., PUB. UTILS. 
FORT. (June 2010), http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2010/06/fit-usa, available at http://perma.
cc/EEF7-BG2A; Steven Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal Preemption and Technological 
Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 47 (1991); Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI 
Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 89, 89 (2012). 
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ronmental groups, low-income consumers, and businesses outside the state.8 
And many of these challenges to state policies have been found valid: 
• The California feed-in tariff was stricken as illegal/unconstitutional.9 
• State RPS programs are being challenged in several states as implemented 
in an unconstitutional manner, and have been stricken when challenged on 
constitutional grounds.10 
• A recent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) adjudicatory or-
der casts uncertainty on the scope of net metering mechanisms when states, 
like California, allow a substantial net export of power from the generator 
to the utility.11 
• California’s carbon control law is under several serious, and in some cases 
already successful, legal challenges.12 
• Other state regulation of power has been stricken as unconstitutional.13 
California was challenged as to whether its regulatory actions regarding 
sustainable energy fuels violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. California lost in the federal trial court,14 but the decision was recently 
reversed in a controversial split decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.15 The Ninth Circuit decision seems to reconfigure the past three-
quarters of a century of Supreme Court precedent applying the Commerce 
Clause, as analyzed below.16 The Ninth Circuit held that states can disregard the 
dormant Commerce Clause prohibition against interstate commerce discrimina-
tion when they make their statutory purpose the discouragement of CO2 emis-
sions resulting from transport of goods or commerce from outside the state. 
There is no prior Supreme Court sanction for such environmental purposes ne-
gating the Commerce Clause. 
Comparing California’s loss to other states undergoing a dozen dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges to their state sustainable energy regulation, eight 
of the twelve either were settled in favor of the challengers or the state lost, and 
the remaining four have been dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching 
the merits of the claim or are still pending or are on appeal.17 Part II of this Arti-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See infra notes 112–162 and 243–300 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 273–300 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 156 and 158 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Steven Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law: Power Navigates the Supremacy Clause, 24 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 306–08 (2012). 
 12 See infra notes 112–133, 243–300, 333–371 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 163–200 and accompanying text.  
 14 See infra notes 112–138 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 139–149 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 142–155 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 163–200 and accompanying text. 
312 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:309 
cle examines in detail these dormant Commerce Clause dimensions of state en-
ergy regulation. 
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, California has 
been challenged six times regarding regulation of its electric power generation 
facilities and liquid fuels. California has either settled in favor of challengers or 
lost five of these six, and the sixth matter was dismissed on procedural grounds, 
without reaching the merits of the claim and with the plaintiffs receiving permis-
sion to re-file the complaint.18 In states undergoing four recent similar challenges 
to their energy regulation, three of the four either were settled in some manner 
favorable to challengers or the state lost the decision, while the fourth matter and 
one of the originally adjudicated matters on appeal are still pending.19 Part III of 
this Article analyzes the Supremacy Clause bifurcation of jurisdiction to regulate 
electricity and recent challenges pursuant to constitutional doctrine.20 
There is more than constitutional invalidity of certain state energy regula-
tion. California carbon and sustainable energy policy has recently undergone 
seven significant legal challenges raised pursuant to state law. California has 
either settled in favor of challengers or lost three of the four of these that have 
proceeded to a final decision, while one challenge has been sidetracked on pro-
cedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claim, and others are still 
awaiting final decisions.21 New York, the state leading the East Coast Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), has faced four challenges. One was settled in 
favor of the challengers, two were dismissed on procedural grounds without 
reaching the merits of the claim, and one has not reached a decision.22 Part IV of 
this Article analyzes the state law challenges to energy regulation.23 
California and other states have survived these legal challenges sparingly, 
and often only by procedural defenses that dismiss the case before a decision on 
the legal merits of their state energy regulation. This Article analyzes and charts 
the dimensions of legal challenges on carbon and sustainable energy in Califor-
nia compared to other states. There is more to this than a mere “box score.” 
These new legal precedents construct the legal carbon-control future as states 
labor to achieve a sustainable economy. Unconstitutional state energy law im-
poses a significant cost to state taxpayers, who bear several millions of dollars of 
costs to reimburse attorney fees incurred by the parties affected by the law.24 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 243–300 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 301–332 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 201–332 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 301–332 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 372–376 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 333–376 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Anne Galloway, Shumlin Wants to “Bill Back” Legal Expenses in Entergy Suit to Entergy, 
VTDIGGER (Apr. 30, 2011), http://vtdigger.org/2011/04/30/shumlin-wants-to-%E2%80%9Cbill-back
%E2%80%9D-legal-expenses-in-entergy-suit-to-entergy, available at http://perma.cc/S8CS-78L7; 
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 397–98 (2d Cir. 2013). Vermont has 324,389 
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Operating within this evolving law and precedent is critical to solidifying sus-
tainable energy policy. 
The next Part of this Article examines the legal requirements for energy 
regulation pursuant to key clauses of the U.S. Constitution and state law. 
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TRANSPOSED  
TO A CARBON-BASED LIFE FORM 
A major practical and policy problem identified by the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI) states,25 as well as California,26 is so-called “leak-
age” into the state of less-costly power whose carbon content is not regulated or 
affected.27 Because states do not want the carbon costs they impose on their in-
state power generators to promote higher-carbon but lower-cost out-of-state 
power imports, the states consider securing their borders, or at least surcharges 
and dissuading intruding power flows.28 Preventing RGGI carbon control “leak-
age” of power into a carbon-controlled state around the edges of particular state 
carbon emission regulation raises issues of state authority to regulate power 
through mechanisms that affect wholesale power prices.29 
The RGGI Staff Working Group found that a substantial proportion of CO2 
emissions avoided by RGGI could be offset by corresponding increases in non-
RGGI states, with early modeling showing leakage as high as 90% depending on 
the programmatic assumptions, which was reduced to leakage of CO2 between 
57% and 40% over the life of the RGGI program.30 The governors in affected 
                                                                                                                           
household units, with 626,011 persons. See State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/50000.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/
A9GT-AFFD. This amounts to a charge of approximately $14 per average household just for this 
single unsuccessful action through the trial level, and potentially mounting as an appeal proceeds. 
 25 REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 6 (2005), available 
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf and http://perma.cc/XF9W-EYP7. 
 26 CAP AND TRADE SUBGROUP, CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM DESIGN OPTIONS 1–3 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2006report/2006-03-27_CAP_
AND_TRADE.PDF and http://perma.cc/5ECC-WKXE. 
 27 See RGGI EMISSIONS LEAKAGE MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GROUP, POTENTIAL EMIS-
SIONS LEAKAGE AND REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DY-
NAMICS, MONITORING OPTIONS AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS, at ES-1 (2007) available 
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf and http://perma.cc/E9HB-RDDM. RGGI 
states such as New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Delaware are bordered by states that are not 
signatories to RGGI and historically produce a large of volume of electricity from coal-fueled power 
plants. Id. Similarly, California imports power from eleven states, including a large amount of coal-
fired power. See 2006 Gross System Electricity Production, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://energy
almanac.ca.gov/electricity/system_power/2006_gross_system_power.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014), 
available at  http://perma.cc/X2U5-TSMR (showing that California imports approximately ten percent 
of its total electricity from out-of-state coal plants). 
 28 See RGGI EMISSIONS LEAKAGE MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GROUP, supra note 27, at 56–
59. 
 29 STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX 167–87 (2010).  
 30 See RGGI EMISSIONS LEAKAGE MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GROUP, supra note 27, at 42.  
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states agreed to “pursue technically sound measures to prevent leakage from un-
dermining the integrity of the program.”31 California imports power from eleven 
states, including a large amount of coal-fired power. California’s choice to regu-
late carbon at the point of generation is necessary for California to get at the 
problem of high-carbon power leakage into the state.32 
A. The Constitutional Law 
Power is the by-product of understanding. 
—Jacob Bronowski 
1. Facial Discrimination 
Even where a particular energy regulation is within state authority, it still 
must be applied within the constraints of the U.S. Constitution’s Article I 
dormant Commerce Clause, so as not to unduly burden interstate commerce 
within the United States.33 Electric power can move instantaneously in interstate 
commerce within the lower forty-eight states,34 and this electric commerce con-
stitutes an immense quantity of ongoing commerce estimated recently at 
3,882,600,217 Mwh annually,35 with a delivered value of approximately $375 
billion annually.36 This level of commerce exceeds the total amount of corporate 
income taxes collected during 2012 in the United States.37 Wholesale electricity 
is moving constantly in interstate commerce at the speed of light.38 Therefore, it 
becomes a legally questionable action where states burden the free flow of elec-
tricity by favoring which state(s) hosts the facility that generates the power. 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. at 10. 
 32 See HARVARD ELECTRIC POLICY GROUP, FORTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION, RAPPORTEUR’S 
SUMMARY 39 (2007), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/RapporteurReport12-07.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/89YX-XDHB. 
 33 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 34 See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) (transmissions on the 
interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce). 
 35 Data is from 2011. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TABLE 2.2. RETAIL SALES AND DIRECT 
USE OF ELECTRICITY TO ULTIMATE CUSTOMERS, available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.
cfm#sales and http://perma.cc/R5V7-YA8Y (click on first hyperlink for spreadsheet, under “Latest 
year” subsection). 
 36 The average delivered price of all electricity nationwide in 2011 was $0.0966/Kwh, and 
$0.1109/Kwh for residential customers. See Average Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers 
by End-Use Sector, by State, Year-to-Date through February 2011 and 2010, PUBLIC POL’Y INST. OF 
N.Y. STATE, http://ppinys.org/reports/jtf/2011/employ/average-retail-price-of-electricity2010-11.htm 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/KDY8-CDBC. 
 37 Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 9, 2013), http://www.taxpolicy
center.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203, available at http://perma.cc/G5UB-FD43. 
 38 See STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER VOL. I, at 2:1 (30th ed. 2013); Steven 
Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass, and Energy, 45 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1839, 1914 (2004). 
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Geographically-based restriction on interstate commerce, whether discrim-
inating for or against local commerce, raises dormant Commerce Clause con-
cerns.39 The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state regulations that are either 
facially discriminatory against, or unduly burden, interstate commerce.40 Dis-
criminatory statutes are reviewed subject to judicial “strict scrutiny,” and for 
such a statute or regulation to be valid, the state must establish that the statute 
serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means affecting 
commerce to achieve that interest.41 Dormant Commerce Clause precedent is 
“driven by concern about ‘economic protectionism––that is, regulatory measures 
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state compet-
itors.’”42 The Supreme Court has held that statutes that establish regional barriers 
(not necessarily just one-state isolation) and discriminate only against some 
states rather than all states violate the Commerce Clause.43 Even a small discrim-
inatory impact can be stricken under strict scrutiny constitutional review.44 
A court first determines whether regulation or legislation is facially dis-
criminatory against interstate commerce and will only uphold that law if a legit-
imate local purpose can be found.45 Subsidy of in-state businesses, even if the 
taxes to raise the subsidies are imposed on all commerce, can be stricken under 
strict scrutiny.46 The Supreme Court has held that an agency of government can-
not discriminate against interstate commerce “if reasonable nondiscriminatory 
                                                                                                                           
 39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quot-
ing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)). 
 40 See Davis, 553 U.S. at 338.  
 41 Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 100–01. Rader and Hempling argued that courts will not 
apply strict scrutiny to a Renewable Portfolio Standard that bases eligibility on a generator’s ability to 
produce benefits for a state rather than the geographic origin of the electricity. See NANCY RADER & 
SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, at A-3 to A-4 
(2001). Recent court decisions do not support such an argument: Stating a basis in the statute other 
than what a court determines to be the actual purpose or effect of a statute does not allow a state to 
avoid facial discrimination, strict scrutiny, or a finding of a violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 415–16 (2d Cir. 2013); Gade v. 
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992) (“In assessing the impact of a state law on 
the federal scheme, we have refused to rely solely on the legislature’s professed purpose and have 
looked as well to the effects of the law.”); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 
(1st Cir. 1989). 
 42 Davis, 553 U.S. at 328 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 
(1988)). 
 43 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–54 (1977). 
 44 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (“A finding that state legislation 
constitutes ‘economic protectionism’ may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, or 
discriminatory effect.”) (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; City of Philadelphia v. State of New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
 45 See Davis, 553 U.S. at 338 (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 100). 
 46 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1994); Alliance for Clean Coal v. 
Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Illinois Coal Act, like the . . . order in West Lynn, has 
the same effect as a ‘tariff or customs duty—neutralizing the advantage possessed by lower cost out of 
state producers.’”). 
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alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.”47 For 
such a statute or regulation to be upheld, the state usually must establish that 
there is a compelling state interest for which the statute is the least intrusive 
means to achieve that interest.48 The Supreme Court has held, however, that 
“even if environmental preservation were the central purpose of the pricing or-
der, that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation.”49 
The scope of commerce among the states for purposes of a dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis is broadly defined,50 and the Supreme Court has held that 
all objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection, which particu-
larly includes the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce:51 “[I]t 
is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than elec-
tric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or 
manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in this re-
spect.”52 
A limited exception occurs when a state participates directly in the market 
as a purchaser, seller, or producer of articles of commerce.53 This exception does 
not apply to state regulation of private power companies, however, as contrasted 
with a state going into the private power business. State statutes or regulation 
found to discriminate against out-of-state interests based on geography or favor-
ing local interests are found to be per se invalid.54 State and local laws are 
deemed unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause when a law dif-
ferentiates between in-state and out-of-state economic interests in a manner that 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 48 Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. & EN-
ERGY L. & POL’Y J. 33, 58–59 (2009) (outlining a history of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 49 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 204. 
 50 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 621–22 (state cannot discriminate against articles of 
commerce originating in other states unless there is a “reason, apart from their origin, to treat them 
differently”); Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1992) (invalidating Alabama’s 
imposition of an additional disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of 
within Alabama); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 
367–68 (1992) (invalidating the provisions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management Act that restricted 
a landfill’s ability to accept out-of-state waste); Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 108 (invalidating 
Oregon’s increased per-ton surcharge on waste generated in other states). 
 51 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 16 (transmissions on the intercon-
nected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce). 
 52 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). 
 53 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 54 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (noting that if a statute is facially discriminatory, it is 
virtually per se invalid); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); Stiles, supra note 48, 
at 60–61; Patrick Jacobi, Note, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: 
How States Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 
1107–08 (2006) (proposing that a court will likely strike down as unconstitutional any regulation that 
discriminates geographically or through point-of-origin). 
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benefits the former and burdens the latter.55 If the statute is geographically even-
handed, the courts apply the balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. to 
determine whether the state’s interest justifies the incidental discriminatory ef-
fect of the regulatory mechanism as applied.56 
2. Discriminatory Effect Without Express Language 
A challenge is facial, as opposed to as-applied, when the “claim and the re-
lief that would follow . . . reach beyond the particular circumstances” of the 
plaintiffs.57 Even when there is no obvious or overt facial discrimination against 
out-of-state or other geographically-based commercial interests, where the effect 
or purpose is to discriminate, the ultimate impact is enough to make the regula-
tion unconstitutional.58 Even where a statute is drafted in a fashion that is facial-
ly neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, a court applies a strict scrutiny 
standard where the state law has a discriminatory effect.59 
States cannot regulate in ways where the practical effect is to control con-
duct in other states.60 Indirect or direct burdens on commerce in other states are 
not allowed through state law and regulation. States are prohibited from attach-
ing restrictions to any goods that they import from other states: “States and local-
ities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to control commerce in 
other States.”61 Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two 
types of wine, both produced from products produced in the state, even though 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99. 
 56 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (explaining the balancing test for when a statute “regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental”). A facially-neutral statute that imposes an incidental “burden on interstate commerce 
incommensurate with the local benefits secured” would fail the Pike balancing test. See Nat’l Elec. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). 
A statute or regulation would discriminate against commerce itself when the statute (i) 
shifts the costs of regulation onto other states, permitting in-state lawmakers to avoid 
the costs of their political decisions, (ii) has the practical effect of requiring out-of-state 
commerce to be conducted at the regulating state’s direction, or (iii) alters the interstate 
flow of the goods in question, as distinct from the impact on companies trading in those 
goods. 
Entergy, 733 F.3d at 431 n.37 (quoting Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court determined that even under the Pike balancing test, 
the burden caused by a moratorium on interstate transmission of electricity impermissibly exceeded 
the benefits claimed by the neighboring state. Levy v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 57 See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2813 (2010). 
 58 C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390–92 (1994); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53. 
 59 C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (stating that an “ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-
state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition”); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; see also 
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361. 
 60 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1984); C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. 
 61 C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. 
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not needing to mention the state by name, the effect was practically state-specific 
discrimination, and was found to be discriminatory and a violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.62 
A state cannot regulate to favor, or require use of, its own in-state energy 
resources,63 nor can it, by regulation, harbor energy-related resources originating 
in the state.64 The Oklahoma statute overturned by the Supreme Court in Wyo-
ming v. Oklahoma in 1992 involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-
state producers, similar to what occurs in some of the now-challenged in-state 
preferences in state carbon control and renewable energy statutes. As a result of 
the Oklahoma statute, the market changed in response from use of almost all 
out-of-state coal to utilities purchasing “[in-state] Oklahoma coal in amounts 
ranging from 3.4% to 7.4% of their annual needs, with a necessarily correspond-
ing reduction in purchases of Wyoming coal.”65 
In-state fuels cannot be required to be used by a state even for the rationale 
of satisfying federal Clean Air Act requirements.66 Income tax credits cannot be 
given by a state only to in-state producers of fuel additives.67 The courts have 
determined that electrons in interstate commerce cannot be traced.68 The Su-
preme Court consistently has required that the regulation of power by the states 
must not discriminate regarding the origin of power or the ultimate impact that 
may discourage its flow in interstate commerce:69 
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a 
preferred right of access, over out‐of‐state consumers, to natural re-
sources located within its borders or to the products derived there-
from. [A] State is without power to prevent privately owned articles 
of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 282; see also C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.  
 63 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. 
Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 64 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982). 
 65 Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455; see also Miller, 44 F.3d at 596 (even though the Act did not compel 
use of Illinois coal or forbid use of out-of-state coal, by the statute encouraging use of Illinois coal, it 
“discriminate[d] against western coal by making it a less viable compliance option for Illinois generat-
ing plants”). 
 66 Miller, 44 F.3d at 596–97. 
 67 Limbach, 486 U.S. at 271, 278–80. 
 68 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 7 n.5; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. 
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972).  
 69 New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 344 (overturning as a violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause an order of the state Public Utilities Commission that restrained within the state—for the fi-
nancial advantage of in-state ratepayers—renewable power produced within the state). 
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ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they 
are needed by the people of the State.70 
Recent federal court opinions construing state electric regulation have scrupu-
lously followed this doctrine.71 
B. California Carbon Regulation Under the Constitutional Microscope 
1. Assembly Bill 32 
Assembly Bill 32 (“A.B. 32”), the California Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006 (GWSA), requires the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to 
develop a comprehensive plan to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the 
state to historic 1990 levels by the year 2020.72 This equates to an eventual esti-
mated twenty-nine percent reduction from business-as-usual GHG emission lev-
els.73 The GWSA sets a target of reducing statewide emissions to 427 million 
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (“MMTCO2E”) of GHGs by the year 
2020, and highlights reduction measures that were adopted in 2011 to meet this 
goal.74 California’s goal was based on projections that it was on pace to emit 507 
or more MMTCO2E by 2020.75 
CARB is designated in the statute as the state agency charged with moni-
toring and regulating sources of emission of GHGs that cause global warming to 
reduce emissions.76 Among the regulatory options available to CARB, the agen-
cy chose to implement a cap-and-trade system for GHGs, as opposed to a carbon 
fee or carbon tax to implement the statute. California’s comprehensive cap-and-
trade program, prior to lawsuits that delayed it,77 was to commence in 2012. 
The scientific scope of GHG emissions regulated by California is broad and 
regulates multiple gases.78 California regulates GHG emissions from all aspects 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 338.  
 71 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 236 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 72 A.B. 32, 2006 Assemb. (Cal. 2006). A.B. 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, was signed 
into law by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger on Sept. 27, 2006. 
 73 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, PROPOSED FINAL OPINION SUMMARY ON 
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008
publications/CEC-100-2008-004/CEC-100-2008-004.PDF and http://perma.cc/N8WB-8S78. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. Reduction measures for the GWSA are available online. CAL. AIR RES. BD., STATUS OF 
SCOPING PLAN RECOMMENDED MEASURES 1–8 (undated), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
scopingplan/status_of_scoping_plan_measures.pdf and http://perma.cc/RU8-AT4L. 
 76 Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2014). 
 77 See infra notes 357–365 and accompanying text. 
 78 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802 (2012). “Emissions” means the release of GHGs into the 
atmosphere from sources and processes in a facility, including from the combustion of transportation 
fuels such as natural gas, petroleum products, and natural gas liquids. In the context of offsets, “emis-
sions” means the release of GHGs into the atmosphere from sources and processes within an offset 
project boundary. Id. 
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of its economy, not just power generators.79 The California carbon scheme co-
vers all electric load-serving entities (LSEs), including municipal LSEs.80 Elec-
tric generators are required to meet a CO2 emissions level no greater than that 
achievable by a combined-cycle gas-fired generator.81 Any new contracts for a 
term of five years or more for the procurement of baseload generation must 
comply with a performance standard of emitting no more than 1100 pounds 
CO2/Mwh emitted from power generation.82 “Baseload” generation is defined as 
generation that is designed and intended to operate an at annualized capacity 
factor of sixty percent or greater.83 
The program establishes a declining limit on approximately eighty-five 
percent of the state’s total GHG emissions and declines over time to reach its 
goal. “Covered sources” must surrender “compliance instruments” to CARB that 
are equal to their GHG emissions.84 Covered entities can acquire allowances or 
purchase them. There are three compliance periods:85 
• The first compliance period, including 2013-14. 
• The second compliance period, from 2015-2017. 
• The third compliance period, from 2018-2020. 
Regulatory coverage of industry varies by compliance periods. The pro-
gram covers about 350 businesses with 600 facilities in the first phase. Califor-
nia obtains 30% of its power from outside the state.86 During the first compli-
ance period, covered sectors include stationary combustion for electricity.87 The 
second88 and third periods89 regulate more industries where a covered emitter in 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/GA3V-SM3K. 
 80 California is home to one of the five largest municipal power plants by electricity generation. 
AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, ANNUAL DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 38 (2008–09), available at 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/100largestbygeneration.pdf and http://perma.cc/N9GE-P8VL. 
 81 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340, 8341(a)–(b), (d)(1) (West 2007). 
 82 Id.; see Seth Hilton, The Impact of California’s Global Warming Legislation on the Electric 
Utility Industry, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 10, 14 (Nov. 2006). This is a level that conventional coal-fired 
electric generation will not be able to meet, generating about 1770 lbs. CO2/Mwh. Hilton, supra, at 14. 
 83 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340(a) (West 2007). 
 84 Regulatory Guidance Document, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
guidance/guidance.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/G2PL-2STU. 
 85 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95840 (2011). 
 86 MICHAEL N. MILLS, WILL CALIFORNIA’S 33% RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD SURVIVE A 
COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE BY OTHER STATES? A RECENTLY FILED COLORADO CASE MAY 
PROVIDE THE ANSWER 6 (2011), available at http://www.stoel.com/files/TheOverride_Caseofthe
Month_may2011.pdf and http://perma.cc/Q457-2ES6. 
 87 Also included are petroleum refineries, crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, cement 
manufacturing, iron and steel, mineral mining and lime manufacturing, pulp and paper manufacturing, 
food manufacturing, canning operations, and self-generation of electricity. See Regulatory Guidance 
Document, supra note 84. 
 88 Distributors of transportation fuels and natural gas are added in the second period. Id. 
 89 Id. 
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these sectors releases at least 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(“MTCO2e”) annually. The entity must retire compliance credits or instruments 
equal to 30% of its annual emissions by November 1 of the following year, with 
the balance of 70% “trued-up” for a multi-year compliance period.90 The system 
creates two types of legal compliance instruments: allowances91 and offsets.92 
One can obtain allowance allocation from CARB, purchase allowances at 
auction, or purchase them from miscellaneous dealers legally on the secondary 
market.93 In the first compliance period, approximately ninety percent of allow-
ances are allocated free of charge to regulated entities.94 There is an industry 
sector-specific assistance factor that declines over time for many sectors to de-
termine allocation, and an adjustment factor that declines annually to reflect the 
overall declining emissions cap.95 As years progress, there are downward ad-
justments to the industry-specific assistance factor and the cap adjustment factor. 
California thus administers an emissions allowance declining-sum exercise as 
the state moves through compliance periods.96 
As a secondary source to procure allowances, there are CARB allowance 
auctions97 and secondary market trades. In the California system, for auctions 
                                                                                                                           
 90 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 94812(b) (2012). 
 91 See Regulatory Guidance Document, supra note 84. Allowances issued by CARB deliver the 
right to emit one ton of carbon. 
 92 CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE AND CALI-
FORNIA OFFSETS 26 (undated), available at http://www.climateactionreserve.org/wp-content/uploads/
2009/05/CAR-Presentation.pdf and http://perma.cc/C7EQ-HC3Q (offsets can be valid for up to eight 
years from the date of issuance).  
 93 The first auction of allowances occurred November 14, 2012. 
 94 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., APPENDIX J: ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, at J-15 (undated), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf and http://perma.cc/3T3W-PXYF. 
 95 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95891. 
 96 The assistance factor starts at 100% for all industries, but the amount by which it decreases 
varies by industry. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95870(e) (2012) (tbl.8-1). For example, sectors such as 
pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing and aircraft manufacturing ratchet down to 30% in the 
third compliance period. Id. Other industries (for example, crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, 
mineral mining, and certain types of manufacturing) deemed particularly susceptible to “leakage” 
remain at 100% throughout the program. Id. In addition, the number of allocated allowances is adjust-
ed downward annually based on an “adjustment factor.” Id. § 95891(d) (tbl.9-2).  For most industries, 
the adjustment factor declines from 0.981 in 2013 to 0.851 in 2020. See id. Therefore, California sup-
ports extraction of fossil fuel resources of all kinds by supporting their extraction of resources with 
donated allocations of allowances. See id. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive. See id. 
 97 Covered Entities may opt to trade allocated allowances by consigning allowances to CARB for 
sale through auction. The first two auctions were held on November 14, 2012, and February 19, 2013. 
Auctions are open to Covered Entities, as well as a wide variety of other stakeholders, including opt-
in Covered Entities (entities in a covered sector but which emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e) and so-
called “voluntary associated entities,” such as brokers and derivatives clearing organizations. There 
were almost 13 million 2013 vintage allowances, which cleared at a price of $13.62, and 9.6 million 
2016 vintage allowances, about half of which sold at $10.71 each. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA 
AIR RESOURCES BOARD QUARTERLY AUCTION 2, at 1–10 (undated), available at http://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/february_2013/auction2_feb2013_summary_results_report.pdf and 
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there are both floor prices98 and mechanisms to restrain too high allowance pric-
es.99 Utilities are required to auction their allocated allowances, obtain revenues, 
and then rebate them to provide financial rate relief to their customers.100 
The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) rule, part of CARB im-
plementation of A.B. 32, became a particular focus of constitutional chal-
lenge.101 The LCFS is a “set of regulations to govern the marketing of gasoline-
ethanol blends sold in California.”102 LCFS is issued to reduce the carbon con-
tent of transportation fuels sold in California by 10% by the year 2020 from the 
year 2010 baseline.103 The goal of LCFS is to reduce carbon intensity (CI) of 
fuels by 10% by 2020 through regulations requiring providers of gasoline and 
diesel fuels to calculate the CI of each fuel component, report such calculations 
to CARB, and make reductions to meet the CI standards.104 
CARB’s LCFS rule includes the lifecycle GHG emissions of fuel, including 
emissions produced during production and transportation of fuels to California. 
CI is not limited to how much carbon the fuel contains. CI also includes the 
amount of carbon released in the full fuel cycle. The LCFS refers to this inclu-
sive concept as the “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions,” which is defined as: 
aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct 
emissions and significant indirect emissions such as significant emis-
                                                                                                                           
http://perma.cc/8268-TURJ. The price of allowances is managed by a limited price-collar mechanism 
that includes an escalating auction reserve price (“floor”) and a price containment procedure. 
 98 Id.; CAL. AIR RES. BD., ADDITIONAL AUCTION 1 AND 2 SUMMARY STATISTICS 1–2 (undated), 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/additionalauction1and2summarystatistics.
pdf and http://perma.cc/XV6A-ZVD5. To control the floor price, CARB sets a reserve price for each 
auction below which no allowances may be sold. Id. This reserve price was $10 in the first auction in 
2012, then $10.71 in 2013, and will increase annually by five percent plus the rate of inflation. Id. 
 99 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95870(a) (2012). To contain prices on the upper end, CARB is 
setting aside a pool of allowances that will be offered if prices exceed certain thresholds. See id. Thus, 
of the total allowances available, CARB will reserve 1% of the allowances from budget years 2013–
2014, 4% of the allowances from 2015–2017, and 7% of the allowances from 2018–2020 for purposes 
of relieving rising prices should they occur. Id. This reserve will total 121.8 million MTCO2e over the 
length of the program. The price of reserve allowances will increase annually at 5% plus the cost of 
inflation. Id. § 95913(e)(3)–(4). Allowances from future budget years are not placed in the reserve 
until the relevant year begins, but all allowances currently in the reserve are available at each reserve 
sale. Id. § 95913(e)(2). A percentage of the reserve allowances are made available as allowance prices 
reach certain thresholds. Id. § 95913(e)(3). For example, in 2013 the containment reserve will offer 
one-third of the allowances in the reserve if allowance prices reach $40, with another third to be re-
leased if the cost increases to $45, and another third at $50. Id. 
 100 Id. § 95892 (d)(3). “Auction proceeds and allowance value obtained by an electrical distribu-
tion utility shall be used exclusively for the benefit of retail ratepayers of each electrical distribution 
utility, consistent with the goals of AB 32, and may not be used for the benefit of entities or persons 
other than such ratepayers.” Id. 
 101 See infra notes 112–149 and accompanying text. 
 102 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 103 See generally CAL. AIR RES. BD., FINAL REGULATION ORDER (undated), available at http://
www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/CleanFinalRegOrder112612.pdf and http://perma.cc/EWZ5-RQ5Q. 
 104 Id. 
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sions from land use changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, 
related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feed-
stock production and distribution, from feedstock generation or ex-
traction through the distribution and delivery and use of the finished 
fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all green-
house gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming 
potential.105 
To accomplish this CI reduction, the LCFS assigns CI scores to all covered 
fuels.106 The lower the CARB-calculated carbon emission from the GHG emis-
sions lifecycle, the lower the CI score. The LCFS includes the CARB-assigned 
default CI scores for gasoline and gasoline substitutes in a table titled “Carbon 
Intensity Lookup Table for Gasoline and Fuel that Substitute for Gasoline” 
found in Table 6 of LCFS § 85486(b) (“Table 6”).107 To lower CI scores, provid-
ers may blend low-carbon ethanol into gasoline.108 But even if a provider blends 
low-carbon ethanol into its fuel, the provider’s CI score also is affected by the 
other factors of the GHG emissions lifecycle, in particular the location of the 
commerce. For example, in Table 6 corn-derived ethanol produced in the Mid-
west is assigned a higher CI score than chemically similar corn-derived ethanol 
produced anywhere in California, regardless of its transportation within Califor-
nia.109 
Thus, a chemically identical ethanol imported from the Midwest is deemed 
to have a higher CI than ethanol produced anywhere in California, making the 
Midwest product more expensive for fuel providers seeking to meet the Califor-
nia fuel standard requirements. The CI calculation does not account for intrastate 
shipping within the state, notwithstanding that California is the third largest U.S. 
state geographically. California’s 770 miles in length is greater than the distance 
from ten other states to California. Thus, all fuel, wherever produced in Califor-
nia and wherever consumed, does not incur a higher carbon efficiency factor for 
purposes of this regulation. Oregon adopted its own Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
for Transportation fuel,110 similar to the LCFS in California, and supported Cali-
                                                                                                                           
 105 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481 (a)(38) (2012). 
 106 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
 107 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
The LCFS allows for providers to apply for a customized total CI value rather than be subject to the 
assigned default score. Midwest providers have applied for a customized CI value. Id. 
 108 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Providers may also buy credits 
generated from another fuel provider that has credits in order to meet LFCS standards. Id. 
 109 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. 
 110 GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GROUP, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 44 
(2008), available at http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/GBLWRM/docs/CCIGReport08Web.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/42UV-9Y69. 
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fornia by filing an amicus brief in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Gold-
stene.111 
2. The Successful Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge in California in the 
Federal Trial Court 
The LCFS rule was challenged in two court cases where plaintiffs alleged 
that the rule violates federal and state law. One case was under California state 
law,112 and the other under federal constitutional law. In Rocky Mountain, the 
plaintiffs challenged the LCFS rule as violating the dormant Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution.113 The plaintiffs alleged that CARB discriminated against 
interstate commerce and fuels produced out of state.114 
Specifically, the LCFS regulation incorporates into its calculations the dif-
ferences between indirectly associated carbon emissions from transportation, the 
farming methods used to raise the agricultural produce, and the fuel used to pro-
duce the electricity in the state where the ethanol is produced.115 To meet such 
standards, out-of-court competitors somehow would need to spend more on the 
production and transportation of the ethanol to California to reduce their CI 
scores equivalent to those of California’s in-state producers.116 
The plaintiffs in Rocky Mountain argued that their ethanol products are 
chemically identical to comparable ethanol products manufactured in California, 
yet CARB assigned the Midwestern low carbon fuel a higher CI value, which 
made it ultimately cost-disadvantaged and less desirable to California consum-
ers.117 The plaintiffs contended that California fuel consumers seeking to meet 
emissions obligations will seek in-state fuels with lower CI values at a premium, 
which would inflate the cost of in-state fuels at the expense of out-of-state pro-
ducers.118 CARB’s defense focused on illustrating that the market for Midwest-
ern low-carbon fuel was robust, rather than disproving the California regula-
tion’s differential burdens based on the geographic origin of the commerce.119  
                                                                                                                           
 111 See infra notes 112–138 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 333–342 and accompanying text. 
 113 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. 
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. at 1087–88. 
 116 See id.  
 117 Id. at 1086–87. The plaintiffs argued that Midwestern ethanol fuels were assigned ten percent 
higher CI values than chemically identical California counterparts. Id. 
 118 See id. at 1087.  
 119 A memorandum from the state included a subsection entitled “Investment Activity in the 
Midwest Ethanol Industry is Robust.” Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors’ Supplemental Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to RMFU’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (Nos. 1:09-CV-02234-LJO-DLB, 1:10-
CV00163-LJO-DLB), 2011 WL 1233984. The science used by CARB for the LCFS was found to rely 
too heavily on factors of origin to pass the court’s facial discrimination test. Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087. Although the same scientific methods are applied to all fuel sources in 
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State regulation of biofuels was before the Supreme Court twenty-five 
years earlier. In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Supreme Court 
struck as unconstitutional a state law that gave favorable tax treatment to ethanol 
produced in-state, and held that health impacts were only incidental benefits, 
while the Commerce Clause violation was not permitted.120 
In December 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Cali-
fornia agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument, invalidated certain parts of the LCFS 
rule, and enjoined the rule’s enforcement because it “discriminates against out-
of-state corn ethanol and impermissibly regulates extraterritorially in violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause and its jurisprudence.”121 Regulating out-of-state 
conduct is not the only test applied under the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
broader definition of discrimination “simply means differential treatment of in-
state and out of state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the 
latter.”122 The district court held that the LCFS and Table 6 differentiate based on 
place of origin of the commerce and concluded that the LCFS discriminates on 
its face against out-of-state corn-derived ethanol.123 
The court found that the LCFS serves a legitimate local purpose,124 but the 
defendants had not met their burden to show that there was not a nondiscrimina-
tory means to adequately serve their objective.125 The court found that CARB 
had several other means to address the state’s purpose without discriminating 
                                                                                                                           
Table 6, the court found that “the variables within the formula favor California ethanol producers by 
assigning lower CI scores based on location” and thus favor California over out-of-state producers. Id. 
at 1087–88. Some international fuels using different organic sources actually had lower CI scores than 
U.S. fuels using other feedstocks. Id. at 1089–90. Sugar cane-based ethanol, imported from South 
America, was awarded a lower CI value than in-state California corn-derived ethanol because of the 
fuel’s chemical composition, production, and refinement, though this does not affect interstate com-
merce burdens. Id. Some international fuels using different organic sources actually had lower CI 
scores than U.S. fuels using other feedstocks. Id.  
 120 Limbach, 486 U.S. at 271, 279–80. 
 121 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–79. CARB attributed the difference 
in CI values to multiple scientific factors in addition to geographic location factors (emissions related 
to shipping or transportation of fuel). The court relied upon a “table” of CI values generated by 
CARB. 
 122 Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99. Under the Pike test, courts will uphold a non-facially 
discriminatory statute “unless the burden imposed on . . . commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.” 397 U.S. at 142. 
 123 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.  
 124 Id. at 1093. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs argued that the LCFS serves no local purpose and 
that California is attempting to solve the national and international problem of climate change. The 
defendant state cited Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, where the Supreme Court 
affirmed that “a state has a local and legitimate interest in reducing global warming.” Id. (citing 549 
U.S. 497, 498 (2007)). 
 125 Id. at 1094. The court did recognize that lifecycle analysis is a widely accepted national and 
international approach to reduce carbon emissions, but this does not mean there is not a nondiscrimi-
natory means to achieve this goal on a local level. Id. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs offered many 
nondiscriminatory alternatives, including a tax on fossil fuels or solely regulating tailpipe emissions. 
Id. 
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against out-of-state fuel products.126 The court incorporated the requirement 
from Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison to choose the least discriminatory or in-
trusive on interstate commerce means to regulate, when balancing local purpose 
against a statute that either discriminates on its face or impermissibly controls 
conduct outside its borders.127 As the Supreme Court held earlier: “While a State 
may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist that producers or con-
sumers in other States surrender whatever competitive advantages they may pos-
sess.”128 
The district court held that the LCFS “may not impose a barrier to interstate 
commerce based on the distance that the product must travel in interstate com-
merce.”129 The court reached this conclusion by relying on Dean Milk and West 
Lynn Creamery v. Healy.130 Although the LCFS had administrative procedures 
that allowed for out-of-state producers to amend their ranking on Table 6, the 
court saw these administrative procedures as amplifying the discriminatory im-
pact of the regulations.131 Even though the LCFS did benefit some other out-of-
state producers or burden some in-state producers, the court found that this does 
not absolve the LCFS from a finding that it discriminates on its face:132 
“[L]egislation favoring in-state economic interests is facially invalid under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, even when such legislation also burdens some in-
state interests or includes some out-of-state interests in the favored classifica-
tion.”133 
3. Regulation Beyond State Borders as a Commerce Clause Violation 
The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs alternatively asserted that strict scrutiny still 
applies because under the Commerce Clause, one state’s laws cannot “control 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See, e.g., Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 349. 
 127 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093–94. 
 128 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); see also 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (holding that one state “has no power to 
project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the price to be paid in that state for [products] 
acquired there”). 
 129 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
 130 Id. Dean Milk struck a local ordinance that required milk sold in the city to be pasteurized 
within five miles of the city. 340 U.S. at 354. West Lynn Creamery held that a differential burden 
placed at any point in the stream of commerce on out-of-state producers is constitutionally invalid. 
512 U.S. at 202.  
 131 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1090. CARB has the sole discretion to 
amend Table 6 and the CI rankings. CARB can further the discrimination by amending an in-state 
producer’s ranking while denying an out-of-state producer’s similar request without reason. Id. 
 132 Id. at 1089. For example, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol has a lower intensity score than some 
Californian corn ethanol, and in-state producers of corn ethanol are penalized when importing corn 
from out-of-state. Id. 
 133 Id. (quoting Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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conduct beyond the boundary of the state.”134 The defendants countered that the 
only effects the LCFS may have on out-of-state producers are indirect and there-
fore not directly regulating outside California’s boundaries.135 The court found 
for the plaintiffs and identified the issue as “whether the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”136 
The district court pointed out that although the products ultimately may be 
sold in California, CARB and the LCFS are prevented by the Commerce Clause 
from regulating those portions of the lifecycle of these products outside of the 
state: Under the Commerce Clause, states cannot place restrictions on imports 
“in order to control commerce in other states.”137 The LCFS requires all com-
mercial providers, whether within the state or outside, to detail the entire geo-
graphic pathway of the fuel during its lifetime so that CARB may assign it a CI 
score. The trial court held that “this type of regulation ‘forc[es] a merchant to 
seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in anoth-
er,’ causing the LCFS to ‘directly regulate[] interstate commerce.’”138 
4. The Ninth Circuit Decision and Dissent 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit  reversed the district court on the unconstitution-
ality of the California LCFS.139 The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court as 
to the standard of review to apply to the regulation, whether the regulation was 
facially discriminatory and violated the dormant Commerce Clause, and whether 
California’s action was impermissibly extraterritorial.140 The majority did not 
apply strict scrutiny and instructed that the Pike balancing test be applied on re-
mand.141 
In contrast to precedent, the Rocky Mountain majority decision states that it 
is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a regulation whose effect is only for 
out-of-state commerce to purchase additional credits and pay additional fees: 
“California may regulate with reference to local harms, structuring its internal 
markets to set incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in 
California.”142 Because goods are transported using fossil fuels, by definition a 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Id. at 1090. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs cited examples such as the LCFS regulating land 
use in the Midwest and deforestation in South America rather than solely regulating ethanol carbon 
emissions within the borders of California. Id. at 1091. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1092. 
 138 Id. If a provider changes its part of the fuel’s lifecycle, such as changing its transportation 
mechanism to California, this change must be submitted to CARB. Id. 
 139 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for 
cert. filed, 2014 WL 1154199 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1148). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. at 1104.  
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state can regulate to disfavor such goods originating and travelling from out-of-
state. This discriminates by design on the distance that goods travel in interstate 
commerce, which is geographic discrimination based on the point of origin of 
the commerce. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision reconfigures the past century of Supreme 
Court interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause.143 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, a state environmental purpose to reduce GHGs emitted in the state is 
sufficient to impose regulation and costs on interstate commerce entering the 
state.144 The Supreme Court has not allowed environmental purposes to justify 
discrimination that otherwise infringes on interstate commerce.145 The Ninth 
Circuit determined that carbon emission control and delivering commerce into 
the state is an exception, when based on science.146 The Ninth Circuit’s holding 
changes the entire calculus for state regulation of carbon-emitting interstate 
commerce. However: 
• There was a dissenting opinion. Of four federal judges who have ruled on 
this case at the trial and appellate levels, two found California’s regulation 
to be unconstitutional. 
• The primary CO2-creating activities are vehicle fuels, electricity produc-
tion, and agriculture, to which similar state GHG limitations could also be 
applied to favor in-state agricultural products, electricity, gasoline and a tax 
on plane travel from or to the state. 
First, the dissent in the Ninth Circuit found facial discrimination.147 Any 
geographic discrimination by a state, whether along state or other geographic 
lines, is subject to strict scrutiny: “In making [the] geographic distinction, the 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 186 (invalidating equal fee imposed on in-state and out-
of-state commerce, the distribution of which favored in-state commerce); C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 
391 (“The ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered 
by the prohibition.”); Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 93 (invalidating Oregon’s increased per-ton 
surcharge on waste generated in other states); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 355–56 (invalidating the pro-
visions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management Act that restricted a landfill’s ability to accept out-of-
state waste); Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 334 (invalidating Alabama’s imposition of an additional 
disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of within Alabama); City of 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 (state cannot discriminate against articles of commerce originating in 
other states unless there is a “reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently”) (emphasis 
added); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–54; Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 349 (requirement to choose the least dis-
criminatory or intrusive on interstate commerce means to regulate, when it balances local purpose 
against a statute that either discriminates on its face or impermissibly controls conduct outside state 
borders). 
 144 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1106–08. 
 145 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 202; C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392–93.  
 146 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089.  
 147 Id. at 1107–08 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Chem. Waste 
Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 342) (an “additional fee [on imported commerce] facially discriminates”). 
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[regulation] patently discriminates against interstate commerce.”148 The burden 
is on California to demonstrate that no less-burdensome regulatory incentives 
were available to control GHGs. The dissent noted that at oral argument, Cali-
fornia admitted that there were less-burdensome alternatives on interstate com-
merce than “to use lifecycle analysis to reduce GHG emissions.”149 
Second, even where a state statute is drafted in a manner that is facially 
neutral rather than expressly discriminatory, courts will apply strict scrutiny if 
the law has a discriminatory effect.150 Justice Scalia, concurring with the majori-
ty in West Lynn Creamery, noted that “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would 
clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for 
dormant Commerce Clause cases.151 Fees imposed on out-of-state commerce 
have an identical effect to subsidies for in-state industry. Strict scrutiny almost 
always results in the state action being found unconstitutional.152 According to 
the Supreme Court, the scope of commerce for purposes of a dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis is broadly defined,153 which expressly includes the trans-
mission of electric energy in interstate commerce:154 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate com-
merce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and 
every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on 
its own resources in this respect.155 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain regarding regulation of 
carbon and sustainable energy creates an intriguing split with two other circuit 
courts also rendering decisions in mid-2013 adjudicating state versus federal 
constitutional authority to regulate aspects of sustainable energy: 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. at 1108 (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 100). 
 149 Id. at 1109 (quoting hearing transcript). 
 150 C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 (“[An] ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or 
in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; see also Fort 
Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361. 
 151 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 152 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 153 See Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 108 (invalidating Oregon’s increased per-ton surcharge 
on waste generated in other states); Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 336–37 (invalidating Alabama’s 
imposition of an additional disposal fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of 
within Alabama); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 621–22, 627 (state cannot discriminate 
against articles of commerce originating in other states unless there is a “reason, apart from their 
origin, to treat them differently”) (emphasis added); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 355–56 (invalidating the 
provisions of Michigan’s Solid Waste Management Act that restricted a landfill’s ability to accept out-
of-state waste). 
 154 See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 16 (transmissions on the inter-
connected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce). 
 155 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 757. 
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• In 2013, the Seventh Circuit unanimously declared that it is a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause for a state (Michigan) to treat renewable 
power originating out-of-state differently than renewable power originating 
in-state.156 
• In 2013, the Second Circuit unanimously held that it is unconstitutional for 
a state (Vermont) to regulate low-carbon power when the federal govern-
ment has authority over the same aspects of facilities that the state attempts 
to regulate, which affirmed, in part, a decision of the federal trial court.157 
These three contemporaneous 2013 circuit court decisions all hinge on the 
restrictions imposed by the constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause and Su-
premacy Clause on state regulation of energy. Four states—Alabama, Texas, Ne-
braska, and North Dakota—indicated that they were planning subsequently to 
bring suit against California under the argument that California’s separate Re-
newable Portfolio Standard (RPS) program interfered with interstate com-
merce.158 There are additional elements of the California A.B. 32 statute that 
have not yet been challenged, but constitutional challenges might be forthcom-
ing: 
• Whether renewable energy programs that satisfy California Renewable En-
ergy Credits (RECs) requirements should also satisfy GHG mandates.159 
• Whether California’s Renewable Portfolio Requirement160 discriminates 
against out-of-state power by requiring more classes of credits that can only 
be economically created through connection to in-state utilities.161 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 
2013). Judge Richard Posner, in a unanimous decision for the Seventh Circuit, relied on a 2013 law 
review article on constitutional energy jurisdiction issues authored by Professor Ferrey. Id. The court 
declared that state regulation limiting state renewable portfolio standards to in-state generation was a 
violation of the Commerce Clause: “[It] trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michi-
gan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate 
against out-of-state renewable energy.” Id. 
 157 Entergy, 733 F.3d at 393. 
 158 See MILLS, supra note 86, at 6. An RPS program requires utilities to purchase renewable ener-
gy credits, state-created credits associated with generation of enumerated renewable power by eligible 
power generation units.  
 159 Dispute Emerges over GHG Benefits of Renewable Energy Credits, ENERGY WASH. WEEK 
(June 25, 2008), http://insideepa.com/pdf/Energy-Washington-Week/Energy-Washington-Week-06/
25/2008/dispute-emerges-over-ghg-benefits-of-renewable-energy-credits/menu-id-93.pdf, available at 
http://perma.cc/LK3E-N248. 
 160 S.B. 2 (1X), 2011-2012 Sen. 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2011); Decision Implementing Port-
folio Content Categories for the Renewables Portfolio Standard Program, California Public Utilities 
Commission 11-12-052, at 14 (Dec. 15, 2011). Each load-serving entity must obtain a minimum of 
75% by 2017 (increased from an original proposed requirement of 60%) of its overall 33% obligations 
(in 2020) from Category 1 RECs and can procure no more than 10% from Category 3 RECs. Distrib-
uted generation must connect to a distribution system serving end-users within a California Balancing 
Authority area. It is difficult to find in-state customers to schedule power sales and transmission ca-
pacity can be difficult to obtain. There are not that many dynamic transfers, and they are complex. 
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• CARB’s prohibition on in-state power producers from “resource shuffling,” 
evidenced by importing power produced out-of-state to “swap” high carbon 
emissions energy sources for lower carbon emissions energy for the pur-
pose of satisfying California’s GHG cap obligations.162  
C. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges to Other State Carbon and 
Sustainable Energy Regulation 
There has been recent litigation in New Jersey, Colorado, Vermont, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, the Midwest and elsewhere contesting alleged dormant 
Commerce Clause violations163 related to state energy/electric power regulation: 
• Suit on renewable power RPS RECs in Colorado.164 
• Suit on Missouri RPS RECs limited only to in-state projects.165 
• Judgment of the Seventh Circuit that states violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause if they discriminate against out-of-state power in awarding renewa-
ble energy credits.166 
• Vermont’s attempt to discriminate against sale of cheaper interstate power 
that could be sold outside of its origin in Vermont.167 
                                                                                                                           
Geoffrey Craig, Debate Renewed over California Treatment of Out-of-State Generators for RPS Pow-
er, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 20, 2012, at 18. 
 161 Craig, supra note 160, at 18. 
 162 Id. 
 163 For an article concluding that the Maryland RPS program, and others like it that facially dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, likely violate the dormant Commerce Clause, see Anne Have-
mann, Comment, Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy 
Laws with the Federal Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 885 (2012). 
 164 Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (D. Colo. 2012). American Tradi-
tion Institute’s (“ATI”) Environmental Law Center challenged the constitutionality of Colorado’s 
renewable energy standard based on evidence that the state law violates the Commerce Clause. See id. 
ATI’s complaint argued that because the state mandate provides economic benefits to Colorado’s re-
newable electricity generators that are not available to out-of-state power generators, the program 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 1228.  
 165 Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Public Service Comm’n of the State of Mo., No. 10AC-CC00512 
(Dist. Ct. Cole Cnty. June 29, 2011) (decision of Judge Daniel Green, holding that the RPS program 
“takes the cash property of utilities (and their ratepayers) and transfers it to certain customers” without 
due process). The court ruled that the Missouri RPS program was illegal because it required RECs to 
be generated by in-state projects or projects that delivered the power to in-state customers. The deci-
sion was reversed on appeal and was subject to further appeal. Id. 
 166 Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 776.  
 167 Entergy, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 236. The trial court found the state’s actions unconstitutional and 
issued an injunction prohibiting the defendants “from conditioning Vermont Yankee’s continued oper-
ation on the existence of a below-market PPA with Vermont utilities.” Entergy, 733 F.3d at 407. The 
Second Circuit did not disagree with the substantive decision on the dormant Commerce Clause but 
procedurally held that this issue was not yet ripe for review until plaintiffs actually entered into such a 
forced power purchase agreement with the state. Id. at 430. The court required “a factual record con-
cerning incidental effects of such an agreement on interstate commerce” and stated that “[t]his case 
therefore does not present a concrete dispute affecting cognizable current concerns of the parties with-
in the meaning of Article III, and is therefore not ripe within the constitutional sense.” Id. at 430–31 
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• Challenge by regional generators of power in the mid-Atlantic states 
against New Jersey’s in-state energy facility location preferences for new 
power generation, resulting in change in Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC)-approved regional PJM independent system operator pro-
cedures. The trial court did not apply “strict scrutiny” and did not find a 
commerce clause violation, and appeal is pending on the constitutional 
challenges in federal court.168 
• Successful suit alleging that Massachusetts renewable energy incentives 
violated the Constitution.169 
                                                                                                                           
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Second Circuit held that the dispute was not yet ripe, 
the court noted that the Vermont statute could violate the dormant Commerce Clause: “An agreement 
requiring Vermont Yankee to allot a certain percentage of it output to satisfy local demand would also 
likely violate the dormant Commerce Clause.” Id. at 431. 
 168 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, CIV.A. 11-745, 2013 WL 5603896, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 
2013); Order Accepting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Subject to Conditions, and Addressing Related 
Complaint, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC 61,022 (Apr. 12, 2011) (Nos. ER11-2875-000 
and EL11-20-000), 2011 WL 1383624. In 2011, New Jersey enacted legislation to encourage the ac-
quisition by utilities of the output of 2,000 Mw of new in-state power projects. A.B. 3442, 2011 As-
semb. (N.J. 2011). Power generators in the North Atlantic region filed a complaint at FERC alleging 
discrimination against New Jersey’s statute ordering utilities to sign long-term contracts only with in-
state generation facilities that bid to receive regional multi-state PJM ISO capacity payments. Mary 
Powers, PJM Generators File Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from NJ In-State Generation Law, 
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 7¸ 2011, at 11, 13. In response, in 2011 FERC amended the PJM ISO rules 
to prevent New Jersey state law from attempting to encourage construction of in-state power genera-
tion by, in part, causing them to bid power into the PJM system at suppressed prices to win capacity 
auctions. Mary Powers, Rebuffed by FERC Ruling, New Jersey BPU Plans to Look Again at How to 
Attract New Generation, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., May 23, 2011, at 4, 6, available at http://www.electric
drive.org/sites/testing/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/22845 and http://perma.cc/CA9C-N25W 
(on April 12, 2011, FERC eliminated a PJM rule that allowed a prior exemption for projects to make 
minimum offer prices when tempered by state energy programs). Next, a lawsuit regarding New Jer-
sey energy regulation by several existing independent power generators asserted that the New Jersey 
state law is in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because it is predicated on in-state “favorit-
ism,” and that the New Jersey law is a “blatant and explicit effort to promote the construction of new 
generation facilities in New Jersey.” Hannah Northey, Utilities Challenge N.J. Law While Preparing 
to Reap Its Benefits, GREENWIRE (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/10599
45886, available at http://perma.cc/WY38-Z5AR. 
 169 TransCanada, an independent power company with a wind project in Maine, challenged the 
constitutionality of Massachusetts’s RPS program, given that under previous Massachusetts law, out-
of-state generators were allowed to bid to supply power. Complaint at 1, TransCanada Power Market-
ing Ltd. v. Bowles (D. Mass Jun. 1, 2010) (No. 4-10-cv-40070-FDS), available at http://www.ohio
greenstrategies.com/documents/transcanada.pdf and http://perma.cc/8289-T6QQ. TransCanada al-
leged dormant Commerce Clause violations in Massachusetts’s requirement that state utilities enter 
long-term contracts with in-state new renewable energy projects, and that solar renewable energy 
credits be earned only by in-state solar photovoltaic power projects, regardless of where the power 
generation creating the RECs was sold. Erin Ailworth, State Looking to Settle Suit over Law on Clean 
Energy, BOS. GLOBE (May 27, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/05/27/
lawsuit_hits_mass_law_promoting_local_energy_providers/, available at http://perma.cc/8ACD-
9A27. Massachusetts immediately settled rather than risk having its programs exposed to constitution-
al scrutiny by the federal courts. Massachusetts re-opened the request for bidding and allowed out-of-
state as well as in-state competitors to bid and gave TransCanada renewable credits for contracts that 
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These challenges on dormant Commerce Clause claims were either quickly 
settled by the government in favor or the claimant,170 were unsuccessfully de-
fended by the state,171 have split-outcome decisions at the trial and appellate lev-
els,172 were sidetracked by procedural issues that do not reach the merits of the 
constitutionality of the challenged provision, or are still pending on appeal.173 As 
to procedural detours, in American Tradition Institute v. Colorado, plaintiffs 
claimed multiple constitutional violations because only in-state REC purchases 
would satisfy mandatory renewable purchase requirements, only allowing RECs 
to be traded within Colorado, providing solar rebates only for in-state generators, 
providing exemptions for compliance with competitive bidding requirements, 
and allowing for extra RECs only to be purchased at in-state providers.174 The 
Colorado suit claimed seven distinct ways in which the state RPS discriminates 
against out-of-state-energy sources.175 The Colorado RPS statute counts every 
kilowatt hour (Kwh) of renewable energy produced within the state at a 125% 
multiplier.176 At least one-half of a regulated Colorado utility’s distribution re-
quirements must be met by retail distributed generation,177 which under Colora-
do law must be located within the state.178 
The state of Colorado challenged both plaintiff standing and defendants as to 
being proper parties for suit: The state itself was held to have Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity.179 The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, though.180 
                                                                                                                           
did not qualify under the statute. See TRANSCANADA & COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., PARTIAL SET-
TLEMENT AGREEMENT 1–9 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/
solar/settlement-agreement.pdf and http://perma.cc/3DWH-GGG5. 
 170 See, e.g., TRANSCANADA & COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 169, at 1 (settlement 
agreement); Order Accepting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Subject to Conditions, and Addressing Relat-
ed Complaint, supra note 168, at 61,022. The result of the TransCanada litigation was a partial change 
in the challenged regulations. See Order Adopting Emergency Regulations, Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Util., 
D.P.U. 10-58, at 4–6 (June 9, 2010) (revising 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.00 and subsequent related 
regulations). 
 171 Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 764; Entergy, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 183. 
 172 Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n, No. 10AC-CC00512 (Dist. Ct. Cole Cnty. June 29, 2011) (decision of 
Judge Daniel Green). 
 173 Am. Tradition Inst., 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. 
 174 Id. at 1222–40. 
 175 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at ¶ 2, Am. Tradition Inst., 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 
(No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM). 
 176 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3654(e) (2010) (“For purposes of compliance with the renewable 
energy standard, each kilowatt-hour of eligible energy generated in Colorado, other than retail renew-
able distributed generation, shall be counted as 1.25 kilowatt-hours of eligible energy.”). 
 177 Id. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(II)(A). 
 178 Wholesale distributed generation is defined by statute as “a renewable energy resource in 
Colorado with a nameplate rating of thirty megawatts or less and that does not qualify as retail genera-
tion.” Id. § 40-2-124(1)(a)(VI). 
 179 Am. Tradition Inst., 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. American Tradition Partnership and Rod Lueck 
sued the State of Colorado; the Governor; the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Reg-
ulatory Agencies; and the Commissioner, Chair and Director of the Public Utility Commission of 
Colorado. The Governor and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agen-
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National Grid, a large utility in Massachusetts, estimated the cost of $3.95 
per month per residential customer to pay for the Massachusetts RPS program, 
expected to rise by $1 per month by 2015.181 National Grid estimated that net 
metering cost will more than double between summer 2013 and the end of the 
year, and then more than triple again by the end of 2014.182 This currently repre-
sents 5.4% of the typical residential customer bill, before all the projected in-
creases.183 Utilities in California estimate that net metering may mean as much 
as $1.4 billion a year in lost revenue that will have to be added to the bills of 
non-net-metering customers.184 The Wall Street Journal reported that half the 
RPS states considered legislation in 2013 to dilute or repeal their RPS pro-
grams.185 New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York picked the pocket of part 
of their RGGI funds earned from the auction of allowances and supposedly ear-
marked for energy-related purposes.186 
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in a unanimous deci-
sion in Illinois Commerce Commission v. Federal Regulatory Commission, af-
firmed FERC’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service Operator’s (MI-
SO)187 proportionate customer utility allocation of costs pursuant to federal, ra-
ther than state, law.188 For authority for its holding on the respective jurisdiction 
of state and federal government to regulate electricity, the opinion relied on a 
2012 law review article authored by Professor Ferrey.189 It declared unconstitu-
                                                                                                                           
cies were dismissed, as well as the state, based on the fact that they did not directly control or admin-
ister the state RES program. Id. at 1236–37. 
 180 Id. at 1236. One of the plaintiff’s members was a coal production facility that was forced to 
acquire renewable energy at a higher cost and will lose sales and revenue purchasing the in-state re-
newable energy required. Id. 
 181 Bruce Mohl, The Back Story: Green Energy Concerns, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Aug. 8, 
2013), http://hosted-p0.vresp.com/1365955/6c1214d71c/ARCHIVE, available at http://perma.cc/
RS7C-L3H9. 
 182 See id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, at B1. 
 185 Mohl, supra note 181. 
 186 Lisa Wood, Green Advocates in Maine Fear RGGI Funds May Be Used to Close Budget Gap, 
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 24, 2011, at 8–9; Lisa Wood & Rob Matyi, New Leadership in Several 
States May Weaken “Green” Mandates, Citing Cost Considerations, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 2011, 
at 34–35. New Jersey took $90 million from its RGGI proceeds to reduce general state budget deficits, 
and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie in March 2010 indicated that he was planning to take $65 
million from the New Jersey RGGI Fund for a similar purpose.  
 187 MISO, CORPORATE INFORMATION 1–2 (2014), available at https://www.misoenergy.org/
Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Corporate/Corporate%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/75L9-GV74. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan 
and parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. Id.  
 188 Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 777. MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects 
among all of the utilities that draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utility’s overall 
volume of usage. FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some states to initiate court appeal. 
Id.  
 189 Id. at 776 (citing to article by Professor Ferrey). 
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tional any action by a state limiting state renewable portfolio standards to in-
state generation as a violation of the Commerce Clause: It “trips over an insur-
mountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the 
commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-
state renewable energy.”190 Justice Scalia, concurring in West Lynn Creamery, 
submitted that “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would clearly be invalid under 
any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle” for dormant Commerce Clause 
cases.191 
The legal repercussions from this mid-2013 ruling of the Seventh Circuit 
were immediate. Within a few days, petitions were filed in New York— not even 
within the MISO jurisdiction that includes part of twelve states not including 
New York—to reconsider decisions in light of this decision in another federal 
circuit and ISO.192 The complaint of the interstate merchant power provider cited 
this recent decision and noted: 
In a recent, noteworthy case, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to comment on an RPS pro-
gram, that, like New York’s current RPS program, facially discrimi-
nates against out-of-state sources of renewable power . . . . The court 
noted that “Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause 
of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state re-
newable energy.”193 
In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held that the 
Maryland Public Service Commission did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause by soliciting proposals to construct a generation facility within a particu-
lar geographic region, but otherwise found the Maryland state statute to violate 
the Constitution.194 The case construes the effect of Maryland‘s “contract for 
differences” requiring local utilities to enter into long-term power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) only with specifically chosen independent wholesale power 
facilities. As to the dormant Commerce Clause, the plaintiffs asserted that by 
                                                                                                                           
 190 Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in its RPS 
program as a demonstration that out-of-state power transmitted to it was not recognized as of the same 
value as in-state electricity, and therefore Michigan should not pay a share of power line tariffs trans-
mitting power from out of state that did not have equal recognition and benefit. Instead of supporting 
the state’s position, this assertion caused Judge Posner to respond even though it was not the tariff 
issue before the court. Id. 
 191 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 192 See, e.g., Petition for Rehearing of H.Q. Energy Services at 1, N.Y. Public Serv. Comm’n, 
Case 03E-0188 (June 21, 2013). 
 193 Id. at 16–17. 
 194 PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, 2013 WL 5432346, at *22–23, *51 (D. 
Md. Sept. 30, 2013) (“The mere fact that the PSC sought to procure a new generation facility located 
within [a particular geographic region] does not, standing alone, discriminate against the flow of in-
terstate commerce.”). 
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requiring that the plant be constructed in Maryland or the District of Columbia, 
Maryland‘s program violated the Constitution.195 The successful winning bid-
ders who benefited from this in-Maryland situs energy regulation asserted that 
although the plant location was geographically limited, an out-of-state company 
could compete to build the plant within Maryland.196 Even if not discriminating 
against out-of-state businesses, however, this is still discrimination based on the 
geographic location of the commerce, which the dormant Commerce Clause pro-
tects against. 
In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey held that a 
New Jersey law explicitly favoring in-state generation in solicitation of bids for 
new energy production did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, though 
the law was still found unconstitutional on other grounds.197 The plaintiffs had 
asserted that the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it was 
predicated on in-state “favoritism” and  is a “blatant and explicit effort to pro-
mote the construction of new generation facilities in New Jersey.”198 The plain-
tiffs alleged that because the eligibility requirements, including deadlines, pre-
qualification requirements, and other criteria, favored in-state generators, the 
selection process for LCAPP-sponsored generators favored in-state generators. 
All generators selected to participate in the New Jersey LCAPP program were 
from New Jersey.199 The plaintiffs highlighted the legislative record as further 
support that the New Jersey legislature intended to discriminate in favor of in-
state power projects by passing LCAPP.200 
III. LIMITS ON STATE ENERGY GOVERNANCE: FEDERAL  
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
A. The Federal Power Act’s “Bright Line” 
The Federal Power Act directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) to regulate all interstate electricity transmission and to ensure the relia-
bility of the national electricity grid.201 Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act 
provides the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authority to order the operation 
of electricity generation facilities for reliability reasons whenever there is an 
“emergency” that creates “a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the 
                                                                                                                           
 195 Id. at *1–2. 
 196 Id. at *49–50. 
 197 Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *37 (“[I]t appears reasonable that the Board would incentivize 
construction in areas where reliability concerns are in flux. As such, the Board has the authority to 
incentivize construction within New Jersey.”). 
 198 Northey, supra note 168. 
 199 Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *22. LCAPP awarded contracts to Hess Corp., Competitive 
Power Ventures, and NRG Energy. Id. 
 200 Id. at *37. 
 201 Federal Power Act §§ 202, 209 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824a, 824a-2 (2012)). 
2014] Carbon Outlasts the Law: States Walk the Constitutional Line 337 
generation or transmission of electric energy.”202 The Federal Power Act §§ 205 
and 206203 empower FERC exclusively to regulate rates for the interstate and 
wholesale sale and transmission of electricity.204 FERC case law exerts exclusive 
jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,” 
over the “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” and over 
“all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy.”205 The U.S. Su-
preme Court held that Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained 
and not requiring case-by-case analysis, between state and federal jurisdiction.206 
When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal FERC jurisdiction and regula-
tion, state regulation is preempted as a matter of federal law and the U.S. Consti-
                                                                                                                           
 202 Federal Power Act § 202(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)). The Act states: 
During the continuance of any war in which the United States is engaged, or whenever 
the Commission determines that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in 
the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the 
generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water for generating facili-
ties, or other causes, the Commission shall have authority, either upon its own motion 
or upon complaint, with or without notice, hearing, or report, to require by order such 
temporary connections of facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange, or 
transmission of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and 
serve the public interest. If the parties affected by such order fail to agree upon the 
terms of any arrangement between them in carrying out such order, the Commission, af-
ter hearing held either before or after such order takes effect, may prescribe by supple-
mental order such terms as it finds to be just and reasonable, including the compensa-
tion or reimbursement which should be paid to or by any such party.  
Id. (emphasis added). DOE regulations provide that an “emergency” under Federal Power Act 
§ 202(c) can result from, among other things, “a regulatory action which prohibits the use of certain 
electric power supply facilities” or “[e]xtended periods of insufficient power supply as a result of 
inadequate planning or the failure to construct necessary facilities.” 10 C.F.R. § 205.371 (2013). 
 203 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e. 
 204 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 471 F.3d 
1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. 
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash., 554 U.S. 527 (2008). 
 205 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); e.g., Aquila Merchant Serv., Inc., 125 FERC ¶ 61,175 at ¶ 17 (2008); 
Entergy Services, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,020 at ¶ 28 (2007); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Opera-
tor, Inc., 106 FERC ¶ 61,337 at ¶ 14 & n.17 (2004); S. Cal. Edison Co., 106 FERC ¶ 61,183 at ¶ 14, 
19 (2004); Va. Electric and Power Co., 103 FERC ¶ 61,109 at ¶ 6 (2003); Barton Village, Inc. v. Citi-
zens Util. Co., 100 FERC ¶ 61,244, 61,864 (2002); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 100 FERC 
¶ 61,019, 61,039–40 (2002); Armstrong Energy Ltd. P’ship, 99 FERC ¶ 61,024, 61,104 (2002); Pro-
gress Energy, Inc., 97 FERC ¶ 61,141, 61,628 (2001); Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,194, 
61,973–75 (1998); Conn. Light and Power Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,012, 61,030, reconsideration denied, 
71 FERC ¶ 61,035 (1995); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,213, 61,488 (1994); Houlton Water 
Co. v. Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 60 FERC ¶ 61,141, 61,515 (1992); Fla. Power & Light Co., 40 FERC 
¶ 61,045, 61,120–21, reh’g denied, 41 FERC ¶ 61,153, 61,382 (1987); S. Co. Serv., Inc., 37 FERC 
¶ 61,256, 61,652 (1986); Pa. Power & Light Co., 23 FERC ¶ 61,006, 61,018 (1983), reh’g denied, 23 
FERC ¶ 61,325 (1983). 
 206 Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
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tution’s Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing and consistent line of 
rulings by the Supreme Court.207 
The rates, terms, and provisions of any wholesale sale or transmission of 
electricity in interstate commerce are exclusively within federal jurisdiction and 
control, not state authority, under the Federal Power Act, according to Supreme 
Court:208 “FERC has exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of 
wholesale rates.”209 The Federal Power Act defines “sale at wholesale” as any 
sale to any person for resale.210 “The transmission of electric current from one 
state to another . . . is interstate commerce” subject to the Commerce Clause.211 
States, however, retain authority over retail electric sales because “. . . 
FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of power has been specifically confined to the 
wholesale market.”212 As the Court has explained, Congress enacted the Federal 
Power Act based on testimony that Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island 
v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. “has been accepted by everybody as establish-
ing . . . the fact that the State cannot regulate wholesale transactions, although it 
can regulate retail service and rate.”213 
Congress in the Federal Power Act “adopt[ed] the test developed in the At-
tleboro line [of cases] which denied state power to regulate a sale ‘at wholesale 
to local distributing companies’ and allowed state regulation of a sale at ‘local 
retail rates to ultimate consumers.’”214 As the has Court explained, Congress en-
acted the Federal Power Act based on testimony that Attleboro “. . . has been 
accepted by everyone as establishing . . . the fact that the State cannot regulate 
wholesale transactions, although it can regulate retail service and rate.”215 
                                                                                                                           
 207 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982). The Supreme Court 
overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission that restrained within the 
state, for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced within 
the state. Id. The Court held this to be an impermissible violation of the dormant Commerce Clause 
and the Federal Power Act: “Our cases consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution . . . precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, 
over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived 
therefrom.” Id.; see also Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 39 (2003); Miss. 
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 354 (1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. 
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 953 (1986); Montana-Dakota Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246, 251 
(1951). 
 208 New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340. 
 209 Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371 (“FERC has exclusive authority to determine the 
reasonableness of wholesale rates.”); accord Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 471 F.3d at 
1066. 
 210 Federal Power Act, §201(d) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012)). 
 211 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 86 (1927), abrogated 
on other grounds by Quill Corp. v. N.D. ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 298 (1992). 
 212 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002) (italics omitted). 
 213 Southern California Edison, 376 U.S. at 213 n.8.  
 214 Id. at 214–15. 
 215 Id. at 213 n.8. 
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Wholesale rates for sales in interstate commerce are wholly beyond any state 
authority.216 
If states impose a rate in excess of avoided cost by either “law or policy,” 
with avoided cost being the only wholesale power sale rate that states can set as 
delegates of federal authority, the “contracts will be considered to be void ab 
initio.”217 The rates, terms, and provisions of any wholesale sale, or transmission 
of electricity in interstate commerce, are exclusively within federal jurisdiction 
and control, not state authority, pursuant to the Federal Power Act:218 “FERC has 
exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.” 219 
This creates a well-established legal dividing line in United States law be-
tween federal and state government authority to regulate transactions of the pri-
vate electric power industry. The Supreme Court held that Congress meant to 
draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained and not requiring case-by-case analysis, 
between state and federal jurisdiction.220 It does not make any difference wheth-
er a state acts through its legislature or its energy regulatory agency:221 A state 
must stay on the demarcated “state” side of this legal “bright line.”222 
State regulation is not allowed to stand as an obstacle to congressional ob-
jectives.223 State law is not allowed to overrule or supplant federal determina-
tions by adding requirements not consistent with those in federal law.224 And 
power moves interstate constantly pursuant to federal law: The Supreme Court 
held that “it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate com-
merce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every 
commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources 
in this respect.”225 Moreover, the courts have determined that electrons in inter-
state commerce cannot be traced, although we know that they move effortlessly 
interstate through the very design of the interconnected interstate transmission 
system.226 
                                                                                                                           
 216 S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,215 (1995). 
 217 Conn. Light & Power Co, 70 FERC at ¶ 61,029–30. 
 218 New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340. 
 219 Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371; accord Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 
471 F.3d at 1066. 
 220 Southern California Edison, 376 U.S. at 215–16. 
 221 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 
215 (1983); Southern California Edison, 376 U.S. at 215–16.  
 222 Southern California Edison, 376 U.S. at 215–16.  
 223 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 224 See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 969 (2012) (in a unanimous decision, the Court 
held that federal law prohibits states from enforcing requirements regarding “premises, facilities and 
operations” that are “in addition to, or different [from]” those in federal law); Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 225 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 757. 
 226 See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 7 n.5; Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 460–61 (1972). 
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An increasingly larger majority of U.S. power now proceeds through a 
wholesale power sale prior to its ultimate retail sale and disposition,227 thereby 
fundamentally altering the legal analysis of what is and is not now jurisdictional 
for a state and the federal government to regulate.228 As the Supreme Court has 
noted, it is now possible for a “customer in Vermont [to] purchase electricity 
from an environmentally friendly power producer in California or a cogeneration 
facility in Oklahoma.”229 A significant number of independent renewable power 
generators now sell their power wholesale to redistributing utilities or other retail 
competitors that thereafter resell that power to retail customers:230 
When combined with federal preemption law, one crucial result of 
these energy market regulatory reforms has been “a massive shift in 
regulatory jurisdiction from the states to the FERC.” . . . The upshot 
of these federal and state innovations in electricity regulation is that 
state regulators, despite their continued authority over rates charged 
directly to consumers, have much less actual authority over those 
rates than they did [earlier]. Local utilities now obtain power largely 
through wholesale contracts subject to FERC’s exclusive regulation, 
rather than through self-generated and self-transmitted power . . . Alt-
hough state regulators formerly took an extremely active role so as to 
ensure the just and reasonable retail power rates, FERC has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that now drive the electric power 
market and, as a practical matter, largely determine the rates ultimate-
ly charged to the public.231 
Some states ignored such limits, and litigation resulted both in losses and in 
requirements to pay challengers’ multiple millions of dollars of legal costs of the 
successful challenges.232 The Supreme Court in 1986,233 and again in 1988,234 
2003,235 and 2008,236 reaffirmed and enforced the Filed Rate Doctrine as applied 
                                                                                                                           
 227 ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WHOLE-
SALE AND RETAIL COMPETITION MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 10 (2006). “In the 1970s, vertical-
ly integrated utility companies (investor-owned, municipal, or cooperative) controlled over 95 percent 
of the electric generation in the United States . . . . [B]y 2004 electric utilities owned less than 60 per-
cent of electric generating capacity. Increasingly, decisions affecting retail customers and electricity 
rates are split among federal, state, and new private, regional entities.” Id. 
 228 FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 38, at 5:26–:28; STEVEN FERREY, 
EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 560–61 (6th ed. 2013). 
 229 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 230 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 217, 221. 
 231 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 471 F.3d at 1066–67. 
 232 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 183 (D. Vt. 2012). 
 233 Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 963. 
 234 Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371–73. 
 235 Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 50–51. 
 236 Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 527. 
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through the Supremacy Clause, when states attempted to assert jurisdiction in 
areas subject to FERC’s exclusive authority. The 1986 Supreme Court decision 
concluded that the Filed Rate Doctrine limitations also apply “ . . . to decisions 
of state courts.”237 The filed-rate doctrine applies with equal force to federal and 
state courts,238 and also applies to efforts by state regulators to modify the terms 
of a FERC-mandated rate determination or cost allocation.239 
The Filed Rate Doctrine is an absolute prohibition of state regulation of 
wholesale power rates, contracts, and terms, which are reserved exclusively to 
federal authority: “The filed rate doctrine is not limited to ‘rates’ per se: ‘our 
inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or vol-
umes of purchases.’”240 The Supreme Court in 2008 reiterated that the Federal 
Power Act creates a “‘bright line’ between state and federal jurisdiction with 
wholesale power sales . . . falling on the federal side of the line.”241 This most 
recent decision articulated an unbroken line of Supremacy Clause application 
barring state regulation: 
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal authority 
in the setting of wholesale rates and in the regulation of agreements 
that affect wholesale rates. States may not regulate in areas where 
FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and 
reasonable wholesale rates or to insure that agreement affecting 
wholesale rates are reasonable.242 
B. California Carbon Regulation 
1. Preemption of California Regulation and Standing 
In the challenge to the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) dis-
cussed above in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene,243 the plaintiffs 
alternatively argued that the California Air Resources Board’s (CARB) LCFS 
regulations were preempted by federal environmental law,244 when the LCFS 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 963. 
 238 See Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 581–82 (1981). 
 239 See Entergy La., 539 U.S. at 47–49. 
 240 Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 966–67; see also N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 
84, 90–91 (1963). 
 241 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 471 F.3d at 1066 (citing the Supreme Court opin-
ions in Nantahala, Southern California Edison, and Miss. Power & Light Co.). 
 242 Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 374. 
 243 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2011); 
see supra notes 113–146 and accompanying text. 
 244 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. The petitioners asserted that the 
2007 amendment to the Clean Air Act, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), precluded 
CARB from its state-level LCFS program. Id. California retorted that regulating emissions is within 
traditional state police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, and “[a]ir pollution 
prevention falls under the broad police powers of the states . . . . Environmental regulation traditional-
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closed off California to federally grandfathered biorefineries that would need 
either to not participate in the California ethanol fuel market or reduce their car-
bon emissions, though not so required by federal law.245 The defendants opposed 
the plaintiffs’ preemption motion not on the merits, but on procedural defenses 
based on lack of standing and lack of causation.246 The U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of California held that although individual plaintiffs had not 
provided evidence of individual standing, at least one of the industry plaintiff’s 
members suffered an actual injury that establishes associational standing.247 
The doctrine of conflict preemption is triggered when a state law actually 
conflicts with a federal law, and therefore a party cannot comply with both the 
state and federal law.248 Having already found the LCFS illegal, the district court 
did not resolve the claim and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise it.249 
Neither party addressed whether the LCFS regulation was severable.250 Because 
the state opposed an as-applied preemption challenge while the plaintiffs op-
posed a facial challenge, the court required future briefing on these different is-
sues and the standards of review that should be used,251 and denied “without 
prejudice the Rocky Mountain Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion related to 
its preemption claim.”252 
A challenge is facial, as opposed to as-applied, when the claim and the re-
lief that would follow reach beyond the particular circumstances of the plain-
tiffs.”253 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the district 
                                                                                                                           
ly has been a matter of state authority.” Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 
2003). There is a “savings clause” for states in the Clean Air Act: “[N]othing in this chapter shall 
preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce [any pollu-
tion standard] . . . except that . . . such State . . . may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or 
limitation which is less stringent than the [federal] standard . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
 245 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. These federal objectives were as-
serted by the plaintiffs to include reducing the United States’s GHG emissions, enhancing energy 
independence, and protecting pre-existing investment in renewable energy. Id. The plaintiffs argued 
that Congress struck a balance by not mandating pre-existing biorefineries to reduce their lifecycle 
carbon emissions as outlined in the statute. Id. at 1094–95. 
 246 Id. at 1095. The Rocky Mountain plaintiffs were comprised of “groups that have an interest in 
protecting the corn ethanol industry,” including corn growers, users, merchants and marketers of dis-
tillers grain, producers of corn ethanol, and importers of ethanol into California from other states. Id. 
at 1096. 
 247 Id. at 1099–1100. The court pointed to two specific affidavits that named specific plants that 
will be harmed by the LCFS and alleged injuries that have been suffered, and therefore the court 
found the first prong satisfied. Id. Growth Energy previously submitted evidence that satisfied this 
prong. Id. at 1100. 
 248 Id. at 1101. 
 249 Id. at 1101–02.  
 250 Id. at 1102. “Neither party explains sufficiently their position of whether the LCFS is a series 
of severable restrictions on dissimilar entities or single, integrated market-based compliance mecha-
nism that applies to all fuel providers in the California market.” Id.  
 251 Id. at 1102–03. 
 252 Id. at 1103. 
 253 Id. at 1102. 
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court’s injunction in April 2012, pending appeal.254 On appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, CARB255 cited Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. for the proposition that all 
preemption analyses must start with the assumption that the historic police pow-
ers of the state are not superseded by a federal act unless that was clearly the 
intent of Congress,256 particularly in areas of traditional state regulation, such as 
pollution control.257 CARB relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in another 
preemption challenge to CARB regulations, Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. 
Goldstene.258 CARB argued that the Energy Independence and Security Act’s 
(EISA) savings clauses clearly limit its preemptive reach259 and cited two sepa-
rate savings clauses in the statute.260 
If the Ninth Circuit should reverse as to the violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause holding, the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs requested that the court 
simply vacate the preliminary injunction and remand because the district court 
record is complete.261 The plaintiffs noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Engine 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District invoked 
Clean Air Act preemption “against rules enacted by a political subdivision of 
California that prohibited the purchase or leasing of vehicles which failed to 
meet certain emissions requirements.”262 The Court found that “a state law need 
not actually interfere with federal law to be considered ‘related to’ the federal 
law for the purposes of preemption.”263 
                                                                                                                           
 254 Id. 
 255 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 3, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL 2338857. 
 256 Id. at 111. 
 257 Id. at 112. 
 258 Pac. Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1167 (2011) (air pollution preven-
tion falls under the broad police powers of the states). 
 259 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 255, at 112. 
 260 Id. at 112–13. The first cited savings clause states, “[e]xcept to the extent expressly provided 
in this Act or an amendment made by this Act, nothing in this Act or an amendment made by this Act 
supersedes, limits the authority provided or responsibility conferred by, or authorizes any violation of 
any provision of law (including a regulation), including any energy or environmental law or regula-
tion.” Id. at 112. The second cited clause repeats what the first states: “Except as provided in section 
211(o)(12) of the Clean Air Act, nothing in the amendments made by this title to section 211(o) of the 
Clean Air Act shall be construed as superseding, or limiting, any more environmentally protective 
requirement under the Clean Air Act, or under any other provision of State or Federal law or regula-
tion, including any environmental law or regulation.” Id. at 112–13.  
 261 Brief of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union Appellees at 128, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 
730 F.3d 1070 (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135) (the district court “should be given the opportunity in the 
first instance to reweigh the factors relevant to a preliminary injunction analysis in light of a decision 
on the Commerce Clause issues or to potentially resolve the preemption issue on the merits”). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
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2. Planes, Trains, and Automobiles—Trucks and Buses 
The California Dump Truck Owners Association (CDTOA) filed suit in the 
U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of California in February 2011 to chal-
lenge CARB’s Truck and Bus Regulation, which provides for stricter emissions 
standards for dump trucks and other diesel-fuel vehicles.264 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the regulation is unconstitutional because it is preempted by the Federal 
Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA).265 
In December 2012, the district court concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction and dismissed the case on procedural grounds rather than reaching 
the merits of the claims.266 The district court determined that the EPA was a nec-
essary and indispensable party to the litigation due to the EPA’s interests in the 
State Implementation Plan of California, which requires federal approval, and at 
which point the plan becomes a matter not only of state law but also federal 
law.267 Because the district court could not grant any practical relief without 
joining the EPA, but claims challenging EPA final decisions must be brought in 
the federal circuit courts, the district court concluded that the action could not 
proceed without the necessary parties and should be dismissed.268 The procedur-
al hiatus in this case prevented the court from reaching the constitutional merits 
of the challenge.269 
Additionally, the CDTOA indicated that it would file a petition for re-
view with the Ninth Circuit that challenged the EPA’s approval of the California 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) under the theory that the SIP impermissibly 
conflicts with federal laws, specifically the FAAAA and the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause. While its language may preempt state regulation in the form 
of controls on who can enter the trucking industry within a state, it does not ap-
pear to limit a state’s ability to regulate emission standards.270 CDTOA was also 
seeking an injunction to prevent CARB’s ability to enforce the regulation, as the 
                                                                                                                           
 264 Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 
2012). The regulation required particulate matter retrofits beginning in 2012, and will require re-
placement of older engines beginning in 2015. Id. at 1133. The plaintiffs complained that the $18,000 
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 265 Id. at 1134.  
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of EPA’s approval of California’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act because the 
Truck and Bus Regulation is part of California’s SIP. Id. Because exclusive jurisdiction of final EPA 
decisions, such as SIP approval, lies with the court of appeals, the district court concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction. Id.  
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 See id. 
 270 See Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, § 601, H.R. 2739, 103rd 
Cong. (1994). 
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newly imposed regulations would impair an already struggling regional industry 
and economy and have further alleged devastating effects.271 This was because 
the regulations essentially require all diesel powered vehicles utilized in the in-
dustry to be replaced with new CARB-compliant vehicles.272 To this date, there 
is no record of the suit actually filed in the California trial court system. 
3. California’s Feed-In Tariff 
After enacting a state feed-in tariff requiring California state utilities to 
make wholesale power purchases from combined heat and power (“CHP” or 
cogeneration) units of less than 20 Mw at prices well in excess of wholesale 
rates for power and in excess of avoided costs established pursuant to federal 
law, there was a challenge before FERC as to whether this violated the Federal 
Power Act and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. California argued 
that its environmental purpose for regulation should make it exempt from any 
preemption in setting above-market wholesale feed-in renewable tariff rates for 
cogeneration facilities and that a generic “adder” for environmental costs could 
be used to inflate avoided costs.273 The affected utilities and others countered 
that federal law does not allow state regulation of wholesale sales to achieve 
state environmental goals, that constitutional preemption cannot be avoided 
based on an environmental purpose of the otherwise preempted state regulation, 
and states may not under the guise of environmental regulation adopt an eco-
nomic regulation that requires purchases of electricity at a wholesale price out-
side the framework of the Federal Power Act, or if acting under the Public Utili-
ty Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), at a price that exceeds avoided cost.274 
FERC rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic environmen-
tal rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal law or as set by 
FERC.275 FERC did not agree with the legality of state-established feed-in tariffs 
and held that wholesale generators can receive no more than system-wide avoid-
ed cost for power sales: “[E]ven if a QF [Qualifying Facility] has been exempted 
pursuant to the Commission’s regulations from the ratemaking provisions of the 
Federal Power Act, a state still cannot impose a ratemaking regime inconsistent 
with the requirements of PURPA and this Commission’s regulations—i.e., a state 
cannot impose rates in excess of avoided cost.”276 
                                                                                                                           
 271 Tina Grady Barbaccia, CA Dump Truck Owners Association Sues CARB, BETTER ROADS (Feb. 
17, 2011), http://www.betterroads.com/ca-dump-truck-owners-association-sues-carb/, available at 
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 273 Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, S. Cal. Edison Co., Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., San Diego Gas & Elec. 
Co., 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 at ¶¶ 3–4, 10 (2010) (order on petitions for declaratory order). 
 274 Id. at ¶¶ 7–11. 
 275 Id. at ¶¶ 25–29. 
 276 Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.  
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After losing before FERC, California moved for FERC rehearing, or in the 
alternative a clarification, of this FERC order.277 While FERC dismissed a re-
hearing of whether California had authority over preempted wholesale power 
sale rates,278 FERC did issue a clarification that the avoided costs determined for 
a Qualifying Facility selling power to the utility could be determined with re-
spect to actual costs incurred by the purchasing electric utility, and reflecting 
requirements or restrictions imposed under state law on the renewable technolo-
gies eligible to supply power, thus yielding different tariffs for different technol-
ogies subject to state law power supply mix requirements.279 This clarified that a 
state can utilize its long-standing authority to specify what mix of power genera-
tion technologies a regulated utility should procure going forward.280 
FERC rejected California’s argument that avoided cost did not have to be 
the lowest cost for procurement of a particular type or technology of power re-
source.281 The avoided cost that a utility could be ordered by a state to pay for 
wholesale power, subject to state technology supply requirements imposed on 
regulated utilities and retail suppliers, would be the cost at which the particular 
purchasing utility could either itself construct or purchase such type of power.282 
California had added an arbitrary ten percent bonus or “adder” for all combined 
heat and power facilities as a generic transmission system benefit proxy “for 
every kilowatt hour delivered to the electrical grid . . . at a price determined by 
the Commission,”283 regardless of where the cogeneration or CHP generation 
facility was located on the system or the utility system node into which it inter-
connected.284 FERC reaffirmed its prohibition of environmental additions to 
avoided cost calculations that reflect general environmental externality bonuses 
or “adders,” unless they “are real costs that would be incurred by utilities.”285 
FERC reaffirmed that it has “exclusive jurisdiction” over all wholesale 
power purchase rates.286 California was not successful in arguing that it was reg-
ulating only the buyers (utilities) of power and not the sellers of power in the 
transaction.287 California unsuccessfully argued that its environmentally benefi-
cial purposes should make it exempt from preemption in setting non-market-
                                                                                                                           
 277 S. Cal. Edison Co. et al., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 (2010) (order granting clarification and dismiss-
ing rehearing). 
 278 Id. at ¶¶ 15, 19. 
 279 Id. at ¶ 20. 
 280 Id.  
 281 Id. at ¶¶ 13, 29. 
 282 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2013). 
 283 S. Cal. Edison Co. et al., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 at ¶ 13 (citing and upholding S. Cal. Edison Co., 
71 FERC ¶ 61,269). 
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 285 Id. at ¶ 31.  
 286 Id. at ¶ 72 n.99 (citing Southern California Edison, 376 U.S. at 205). 
 287 Teresa Morton & Jeffrey Peabody, Feed-In Tariffs: Misfits in the Federal and State Regulatory 
Regime?, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 17, 20–21 (2010). 
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conforming wholesale rates for a state feed-in tariff.288 FERC reiterated that only 
the federal government can regulate commerce between the states, and Califor-
nia cannot attempt to regulate commerce outside its borders.289 
There was precedent regarding California energy sale prices fifteen years 
earlier that preempted certain California clean energy regulation altering whole-
sale renewable energy prices as impermissible.290 The Ninth Circuit held that 
wholesale power sale rates could not be altered by California legislation or regu-
latory action.291 In addition, fifteen years before the 2010 matter, in Southern 
California Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Electric,292 FERC refused to sanction a 
California order for utilities and their ratepayers to pay a higher price for renew-
able wholesale power. Under the filed-rate doctrine, any dispute about these mat-
ters may not be arbitrated by the state but is reserved exclusively to federal au-
thority.293 The Ninth Circuit agreed in deciding a California case in 2006, just 
four years before the 2010 dispute over the California feed-in tariff.294 Although 
this 2006 decision proceeded on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court295 and there-
after was remanded to FERC for more clarification,296 this element of its holding 
was not overturned when before the Supreme Court. 
In 2013, the Supreme Court held that a city in California was preempted by 
the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 from imposing 
additional regulation on diesel truck emissions for those trucks that accessed its 
port.297 While addressing state and local environmental regulation, the Supreme 
Court held that federal law is preemptive of state and local law.298 In the six Cal-
ifornia matters above, addressing the borders of federal and state authority over   
energy and environmental matters, federal authority preempted state authority 
in five of these case decisions at either the trial or appellate levels, but not al-
ways both,299 and the sixth was procedurally dismissed without reaching the 
                                                                                                                           
 288 Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n et al., 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010) (order on petitions for declaratory 
order). 
 289 S. Cal. Edison Co. et al., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 (order granting clarification and dismissing re-
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 290 Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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 292 S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,215 (1995). Edison, one of the affected utilities, had whole-
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of renewable prices as high as $0.066 per Kwh. Id. at ¶ 61,667.  
 293 Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371. 
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 299 American Trucking, 133 S. Ct. at 2105; Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 527; Indep. Energy Pro-
ducers, 36 F.3d at 853; Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1131; S. Cal. Edison Co. et 
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merits because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Two of the three decisions 
were rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court.300 
C. Energy Preemption Outside California 
Other recent federal court decisions are consistent on preempted state au-
thority over certain energy regulation: 
• A federal court ruling that Vermont regulation of its wholesale power pref-
erences and sales violated the U.S. Constitution and was preempted.301 
• A decision in 2013 by the Seventh Circuit that federal authority over 
transmission of low-carbon sustainable energy is binding on states that 
have contrary policies.302 
• A FERC decision adjudicating a Connecticut-mandated above-market feed-
in tariff ordered to be paid by regulated utilities to government-owned re-
newable energy projects. The decision held not only that such a feed-in tar-
iff was not consistent with federal law and FERC authority over such mat-
ters, but if states impose a rate in excess of avoided cost by either “law or 
policy,” the “contracts will be considered to be void ab initio.”303 
• After a Rhode Island consumer instituted suit, rather than risk a court de-
termination on the merits, the state amended its net metering program to 
put a cap of 125% of host site consumption on the amount of net metering 
permitted, reduced the payment to the avoided cost rate allowed under 
PURPA, and allowed municipal net metering customers to reallocate cred-
its among all the municipality’s accounts.304 In the Riggs case, FERC re-
fused the plaintiff’s request to launch an enforcement action.305 
• There is a pending dispute in federal district court in Maryland finding un-
constitutional in the trial court Maryland‘s contract for differences‖ (CfD) 
requiring local utilities to enter into long term power purchase agreements 
(PPAs) with certain power generators located only in-state. Maryland rate-
payers supply the CfD price between a successful generator‘s winning bid 
to the PJM ISO, which manages wholesale power sales, and the PPA rates. 
Plaintiffs successfully asserted that Maryland‘s program sets a state-
                                                                                                                           
 300 American Trucking, 133 S. Ct. at 2105; Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 527. 
 301 Entergy, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 233–34.  
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sponsored wholesale rate disguised as a contract with specific in-state gen-
erators, disrupting the otherwise competitive FERC- approved wholesale 
power markets and artificially suppressing the value of electric capacity 
payments cleared in the market for all other regional wholesale genera-
tors.306 
• A pending lawsuit, now on appeal, by several existing independent power 
generators successfully alleged preemption as well as without success a 
violation of the Constitution‘s dormant Commerce Clause with in-state 
“favoritism” regarding New Jersey’s “blatant and explicit effort to pro-
mote the construction of new generation facilities in New Jersey.”307 In 
response, in 2011, FERC amended the PJM ISO rules to prevent New Jer-
sey state law from attempting to encourage construction of in-state power 
generation by, in part, causing them to bid power into the PJM system at 
suppressed prices to win capacity auctions.308 The utilities pay a cost equal 
to the difference between the FERC-approved PJM market clearing price 
and a contractually established New Jersey regulatory benchmark price, 
not dissimilar to the contested Maryland dispute, above. Both state stat-
utes were stricken as unconstitutional.309 
Many of these state energy regulatory efforts are contested as violations of 
both the Supremacy Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. As noted in the 
first bullet above, in 2012 a federal trial court in a much-watched case in Ver-
mont found preemption of state power to regulate and dormant Commerce 
Clause violations, resulting from state attempts to regulate wholesale power pric-
ing and to discriminate in the preference for in- state power moving in interstate 
commerce.310 The federal trial court held that the Federal Power Act invests the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission with “exclusive authority to regulate the 
transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce,” 
and struck the state regulation as unconstitutional.311 The Vermont federal trial 
court decision held: 
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.: 
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Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal authority 
in the setting of wholesale rates and in the regulation of agreements 
that affect wholesale rates. States may not regulate in areas where 
FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and 
reasonable wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting 
wholesale rates are reasonable. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex 
rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988) . . . [A] state “must . . . give ef-
fect to Congress’ desire to give FERC plenary authority over inter-
state wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States do not interfere 
with this authority.” Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 
U.S. 953, 966 (1986) . . . Under the “filed-rate doctrine,” state courts 
and regulatory agencies are preempted by federal law from requiring 
the payment of rates other than the federal filed rate. See Entergy La., 
Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003) (“The filed rate 
doctrine requires ‘that interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed 
by FERC must be given binding effect by state utility commissions 
determining intrastate rates.’” (quoting Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 
962)).312 
In the second bulleted matter above, Judge Richard Posner, writing for a 
unanimous Seventh Circuit, affirmed FERC’s approval of the Midwest Inde-
pendent Service Operator’s (MISO’s)313 proportionate customer utility allocation 
of transmission costs for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable 
power to populated areas.314 For authority for its holding on the respective juris-
diction of state versus federal government to regulate electricity, the opinion re-
lied on a 2012 law review article authored by Professor Ferrey.315 The petition-
ing states had raised six challenges to the original ISO opinion,316 each of which 
was rejected by the Seventh Circuit. The court dismissed the Tenth Amendment 
challenge as “frivolous,” noting that it was “. . . a far cry from the federal gov-
ernment’s conscripting a state government into federal service.”317 The petition-
                                                                                                                           
 312 Entergy, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 233–34.  
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ers unsuccessfully argued that the cost allocation would violate the Federal Pow-
er Act by unjustly requiring utilities to bear costs disproportionate to the benefits 
that they would receive.318 The court deferred to the ISO’s determination of cost 
allocation.319 
The case highlighted in the final bullet above also raised field preemption 
and conflict preemption of the New Jersey Long-Term Capacity Agreement pilot 
program (LCAPP) proposal, a subsidy program effected through “contracts for 
differences.”320 In its defense, New Jersey asserted that LCAPP is a mere plan-
ning measure, with any effect on FERC authority as only incidental.321 The trial 
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both preemption challenges and held that 
the Federal Power Act preempted LCAPP under the doctrines of field preemp-
tion and conflict preemption.322 
Even in the absence of field preemption, state law can still be superseded 
based on conflict preemption if the state law interferes with a federal goal.323 
The plaintiffs contended that LCAPP was conflict preempted because by New 
Jersey guaranteeing a fixed price for select New Jersey generators, this allows 
such generation effectively to bid below the true cost of new entry for the re-
gional multi-state FERC-approved capacity auction, and thereby obstructs the 
federal goal of a competitive auction without any approved selective subsidies 
for capacity resources.324 The plaintiffs alleged that, because LCAPP-selected 
New Jersey generators bidding lower amounts to PJM ISO will win the PJM 
auction and be guaranteed a substantial capacity payment passed on to all PJM 
ratepayers in the PJM region (comprised of all or parts of thirteen states and 
Washington, D.C.),325 this state-manipulated behavior, compared to what would 
occur absent such state influence, drives down the winning clearing price at the 
PJM forward-capacity auction, resulting in lower clearing prices and capacity 
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revenues for all power generators than if such state-subsidized entrants had not 
been allowed to bid under these circumstances.326 
There is a federal district court decision in Maryland invoking two prongs 
of the Constitution.327 It construes Maryland’s “contract for differences” requir-
ing local utilities to enter into long term PPAs. The utilities pay a cost equal to 
the difference between the FERC-approved PJM market clearing price and a 
contractually established Maryland regulatory benchmark price. As to the Su-
premacy Clause compliance, the plaintiffs assert that Maryland’s program is a 
state-sponsored wholesale rate disguised as a contract with specific in-state gen-
erators. Maryland’s “contract for differences” (CfD) program shifts power from 
the federal government to the state, disrupting FERC-approved wholesale power 
markets. Maryland ratepayers supply the wedge price between the winning PJM 
bid and the PPA rates. This wedge will artificially suppress the capacity pay-
ments cleared for all generators. In 2013, the court found “that Congress intend-
ed to use the FPA to give FERC exclusive jurisdiction over setting wholesale 
electric energy and capacity rates” and therefore held the state action invalid un-
der the doctrine of field preemption.328 
Several other state programs have not been challenged yet. Although never 
challenged, and where no projects ever were successfully constructed thereun-
der, Connecticut’s “150 program,” requiring regulated utilities to purchase ap-
proximately 150 Mw of renewable power under long-term PPAs with state-
mandated above-market prices having a cumulative value of $689 million, were 
ordered by state law.329 
Other states have proceeded with feed-in tariffs. Vermont, one of a few U.S. 
states implementing feed-in tariffs despite the clear legal prohibitions on such 
state actions, was challenged in 2013 at FERC as to the level of the tariffs it or-
dered the utilities to pay. Oregon, which has a feed-in tariff, was criticized in 
hearings because the subsidy was deemed not transparent or disclosed, alleged to 
be inequitable, and too high in price.330 A business professor who profited from 
the Oregon feed-in tariff confessed that it was much too profitable.331 The Ore-
gon Public Utility Commission (PUC) continued the feed-in tariff unchanged at 
a rate of 55 to 65 cents/Kwh for solar generation of less than 100 Kw capacity 
per unit, or about 600% times the value of the wholesale power to the system.332 
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IV. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CHALLENGES 
A. California State-Law-Based Carbon Challenges 
Assembly Bill 32 (“A.B. 32”) has been challenged multiple times on state 
law claims by greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-emitting parties, by parties out-
side the state engaging in interstate commerce, and by environmental and citizen 
groups. 
1. Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
The Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) program was successfully chal-
lenged on federal constitutional grounds at trial, with the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversing on appeal, as examined above.333 The LCFS regu-
lates transportation fuels that are “sold, supplied, or offered for sale in Califor-
nia” and focuses on the “carbon intensity” of fuels, a metric designed to assess 
“the amount of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel 
delivered, expressed in grams of carbon dioxide per megajoule.”334 California’s 
LCFS requires that fuel suppliers reduce the carbon intensity of gasoline and 
diesel by 10 percent compared to a 2010 baseline by 2020, and is designed as a 
model rule for other states and regions to follow.335 
Distinct from the successful federal constitutional challenge in federal trial 
court,336 in Poet, LLC v. California Air Resources Board the largest ethanol pro-
ducer in the United States in 2013 challenged the LCFS rule in California state 
court by alleging a failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality 
Act (CEQA).337 The plaintiffs also contended that the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) violated the Administrative Procedure Act by excluding certain 
emails from consultants in the rulemaking file made available to the public.338 
The trial court found against the challengers but was reversed on appeal.339 The 
appellate court held that California had, in fact, violated CEQA and the Califor-
nia Administrative Procedure Act by approving the regulation before the re-
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quired review under CEQA.340 After ruling against the state, however, the court 
refrained from enjoining the regulation under state law.341 The California appeals 
court denied the state’s request for rehearing. The parties were directed to submit 
comments about remedies for these violations.342 
2. CEQA Compliance and Process for New Projects 
There was a challenge by a respected environmental organization to a Cali-
fornia statute attempting to limit the scope of review of environmental approvals 
for carbon-neutral development projects that would spend at least $100 million 
on construction in the state.343 The California statute would truncate review of a 
challenge to compliance with CEQA.344 Assembly Bill 900 (“A.B. 900”) al-
lowed legal challenges filed pursuant to alleged failures under CEQA to bypass 
the trial court and go directly to a state court of appeal on a fast-track. When 
A.B. 900 was challenged, the court held that such limitations were unconstitu-
tional under state law given constitutional mandates allowing writs of mandamus 
to be brought in trial courts.345 Separately, in mid-2013, two environmental 
groups sued California for giving only the state supreme courts exclusive juris-
diction over decisions involving the siting and permitting of natural gas-fired 
power plants.346 
3. Cap-and-Trade Auction Litigation 
The California decision to implement an auction process for allowance dis-
tribution, raising money from the auction of allowances to covered entities to 
emit carbon, was challenged by the California Chamber of Commerce at the end 
of 2012 in California Chamber of Commerce v. California Air Resources 
Board.347 The complaint asserted that Assembly Bill 32 (“A.B. 32”) does not 
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 346 Communities for a Better Env’t v. Energy Res. Conservation and Development Comm’n, No. 
RG13-681262, Cal. Super. Ct. (May 29, 2013). 
 347 Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief at ¶¶ 9–14, Cal. 
Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Cal. Super. Ct. (2012) (No. 34-2012-80001313), 2012 
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authorize CARB to impose fees other than those needed to cover the ordinary 
administrative costs of implementing a state emissions regulatory program.348 
The California Chamber of Commerce claimed that CARB itself projected to 
raise a total of $70 billion, which is well in excess of that necessary to regulate 
the conduct of the entities paying the fees.349 The Sacramento Superior Court 
heard oral arguments in May 2013 and decided that the auction was not a tax in 
disguise. At the end of 2013, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs and 
petitioners on all causes of action, including that the high revenues to be gener-
ated through auctions constitute an impermissible tax.350 
A separate, subsequent 2013 suit brought by different plaintiffs challenged 
the California GHG allowance auctions under its emissions cap-and-trade pro-
gram as an unconstitutional tax or fee,351 and raised similar concerns to those in 
the Chamber of Commerce litigation.352 In Morning Star Packing Co. v. CARB, 
Morning Star argued that the auction revenues cannot be characterized as valid 
regulatory fees because the revenues are not limited to the reasonable costs of 
any regulatory program.353 Morning Star further asserted that CARB has not 
established any reasonable relationship between the revenues generated by bids 
made at auction and either the regulatory burdens posed by auction bidders or 
the benefits auction bidders receive from the regulatory program, and that the 
cap-and-trade-regulation does not prohibit the revenue from being used for pur-
poses that are unrelated to the regulatory program.354 Morning Star also argued 
that the cap-and-trade regulation is ultra vires because A.B. 32 neither explicitly 
nor implicitly authorizes CARB to generate billions of dollars of revenues for 
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 350 Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313, Cal. Super. Ct. 
(2013). 
 351 Morning Star Packing Co. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2013-80001464, Cal. Super. Ct. (April 
16, 2013). The suit asked the court to declare that “the auction and revenue generating provisions” of 
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 352 Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 34-2012-80001313, Cal. Super. Ct. (Nov. 
13, 2012). 
 353 Petitioners’ and Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Issuance of Writ of Mandate at 2–3, Morning Star, Cal. Super. Ct. (June 10, 2013) (No. 34-2013-
80001464). 
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California by selling emission allowances at auction.355 The court rejected the 
plaintiff’s arguments in late 2013.356   
4. Cap-and Trade Scoping Plan Challenge 
CARB’s scoping plan for selecting the mechanism for implementation of 
carbon control in California was challenged by a group representing lower-
income state citizens in Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Re-
sources Board.357 California in 2011 lost this suit against its carbon control cap-
and-trade regulation, 358 resulting in an additional year of delay in the start of the 
entire regulatory program until CARB made any revisions to comply and 
“comes into complete compliance with its obligations” in 2013.359 The petition-
ers claimed that CARB violated CEQA in the preparation of its Functional 
Equivalent Document (“FED”).360 
The court did find that CARB improperly approved its Scoping Plan prior 
to completing the legally required environmental review.361 The court held that 
the scoping plan was selected by CARB prior to the public hearing on it, rather 
than after, and that the CEQA review was “approved” prior to the requirement to 
take public comment prior to a decision.362 The court issued a writ of mandate 
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1493. 
 359 Id. at 1487; Lisa Weinzimer & Geoffrey Craig, Delaying California CHG Cap-and-Trade 
Regime a Year Draws Support From Stakeholders, ELEC. UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 11–12. The court 
issued a writ of mandate enjoining CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until it has 
complied with CEQA by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-trade and public comments. This delayed 
the plan until 2013. Tentative Statement of Decision, Ass’n of Irritated Residents, Cal. Super. Ct. 
(2011) (CGC-09-509562). 
 360 This alleged that CEQA was violated by “(1) failing to adequately analyze the impacts of the 
measures described in the Scoping Plan, (2) failing to adequately analyze alternatives to the Scoping 
Plan; and (3) impermissibly approving and implementing the Scoping Plan prior to completing its 
environmental review.” Tentative Statement of Decision, Ass’n of Irritated Residents, Cal. Super. Ct. 
(2011) (CGC-09-509562). 
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enjoining CARB from any further cap-and-trade rulemaking until it complied 
with CEQA by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-trade and considered relevant 
public comments.363 This delayed the program implementation for approximate-
ly a year until 2013.364 When re-promulgated a year later in 2012 with a more 
robust consideration of alternatives, CARB’s Climate Change Scoping Plan and 
choice of the previous cap-and-trade option was upheld by a state court.365 
5. Additionality in California 
In 2012, advocates for low-income interests in Citizens Climate Lobby v. 
California Air Resources Board attacked the California climate control legisla-
tion on the basis that its requirements would be met principally by offsets from 
exterior state or international locations, without any assurance that the offsets 
would be “additional” to business-as-usual locally.366 First, it was argued by the 
challengers to be ultra vires to the power of CARB.367 Second, the challengers 
argued that the standards implementing the offset program were arbitrary and 
capricious, or not based on a solid administrative record.368 The California trial 
court in 2013 rejected both arguments,369 deferring to CARB’s expertise and 
experience to uphold California’s carbon offset sub-program.370 The court re-
ferred to the limited history and the lack of practical experience that these cap-
and-trade systems have, and reasoned that the legislature’s expertise was suffi-
cient and the court could not choose one methodology over another.371 
B. New York and Other State Energy Regulation 
There are other decisions in other states contesting clean energy or carbon 
regulations as a violation of state jurisdiction or authority: 
• A successful suit in 2010 against New York’s Regional Greenhouse Gas In-
itiative (RGGI) carbon regulation.372 
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 372 In a suit against the state of New York’s RGGI program in 2009, New York’s quick settlement 
had Consolidated Edison Company agreeing to pay the cogeneration project for the cost of its addi-
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• Another suit against New York’s authorization to participate in RGGI.373 
• Another suit against New York’s RGGI program as an unauthorized tax 
that shifted costs to ratepayers.374 
• In 2012, New York utilities challenged New York’s alleged misuse of elec-
tric system benefit charge funds for non-energy-related economic develop-
ment programs.375 
• Regarding fees passed through to electric utility ratepayers, the state of 
Connecticut was challenged for extending a charge and diverting for gen-
eral state budget purposes money assessed electric ratepayers in rates to 
pay the utility for stranded costs (the amount of below-market loss in the 
sale of utility generating assets).376 
V. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY IMPLICATIONS 
Every animal leaves traces of what it was; man alone leaves traces of what he 
created. 
—Jacob Bronowski  
Legal concepts embodied in the U.S. Constitution shaping energy and 
commerce have found expression in current international law. In the European 
Union (EU), EU law includes prohibitions against discrimination by any one 
country against commerce or services originating in another EU member coun-
try.377 The dormant Commerce Clause protects nondiscriminatory access and 
flow of private U.S. commerce among the states, in ways similar to international 
trade agreement rules to prevent international trade discrimination. Regarding 
renewable energy, there are recent disputes regarding analogous in-state discrim-
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 373 Thrun v. Cuomo, 112 A.D.3d 1038, 1038 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); G. Craig & G. Roberts, Law-
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 377 See E.U. Council Directive 2004/18/EC, art. 3, art. 53, 2004 O.J. (L134) 129. 
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ination similar to those involving the dormant Commerce Clause, and claims of 
illegal subsidy of in-country products:378 
• The EU and Japan in 2012 successfully brought a World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) complaint against Ontario, Canada, for requirements of domes-
tic content of solar photovoltaic (PV) facilities eligible for a domestic feed-
in tariff, as violating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).379 
• China in late 2012 initiated a WTO challenge against a domestic content 
requirement of the EU regarding feed-in tariffs of Greece and Italy as vio-
lating GATT and TRIMs.380 
• The United States in 2013 initiated a complaint against India’s national so-
lar program local requirements to use India solar cells and panels as violat-
ing GATT and TRIMs.381 
• In 2012, after determining that “an industry in the United States is material-
ly injured as a result of subsidized imports from the PRC,” the Department 
Of Commerce issued a final order imposing tariffs and countervailing du-
ties on crystalline silicon PV modules and cells from China,382 requiring 
additional duties of 18% to 250% to be deposited regarding such transac-
tions. The matter is now proceeding to appeal in the U.S. courts.383 China 
retaliated by imposing tariffs of up to 57% on U.S. polysilicon exports.384 
• In 2013, the European Commission imposed provisional tariffs on Chinese 
solar panels, citing Chinese subsidies.385 In response, China imposed tariffs 
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on European polysilicon386 and wine.387 The EU thereafter withdrew impo-
sition of the Chinese import tariffs.388 
Between member states internationally, there is prohibition of law or regu-
lations that discriminate against trade in electricity and other goods.389 In the 
United States, the Federal Power Act,390 which has been part of U.S. law since 
relatively early in the history of the creation of interstate electric grids,391 as in-
terpreted through the Filed Rate Doctrine392 and the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, create clear legal demarcations of what the federal government and 
the state governments shall regulate regarding electric energy.393 The dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibits even those regulations that the states have power to 
enact from discriminating against or burdening interstate commerce.394 
What does this mean in terms of recent state energy policy? Assessing sig-
nificant legal challenges to state sustainable energy policy and state carbon con-
trol regulation, California has been the target of an approximately comparable 
number of legal challenges as other states combined.395 This is, in part, due to 
California having one of the most assertive renewable energy396 and carbon con-
trol programs among the states.397 California’s is the only one of the fifty states 
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 397 A.B. 32, 2006 Assemb. (Cal. 2006). California is one of only ten states in the United States 
that regulates carbon emissions. While not the first to do this, California regulates all significant car-
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that adopted all five primary state regulatory mechanisms for promoting sustain-
able electric energy supply, each of which if not designed and implemented with 
legal care, can trigger legal disputes: 
• Net Metering: Also employed in 85% of states. 
• Renewable Portfolio Standards: Also employed in 65% of states. 
• Renewable System Benefit Charges: Also employed in 33% of states. 
• Carbon and GHG regulation: Also employed in 20% of the states. 
• Feed-In Tariffs: Also employed in less than 10% of states. 
Pursuant to the dormant Commerce Clause under Article 1 of the Constitu-
tion, California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard was challenged successfully and 
later reversed on appeal by a divided federal circuit court.398 Assessing a dozen 
other state challenges to energy regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause, 
eight of the twelve either were settled in favor of challengers or the state lost on 
the merits of the claim. Two ruled against the dormant Commerce Clause claims 
but found the state statutes unconstitutional on Supremacy Clause constitutional 
claims, while the remaining two have been dismissed on procedural grounds 
without reaching the merits of the claim or are still pending a final decision.399 
Challenges to California’s sustainable energy policy pivoting on the U.S. 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause have occurred in six significant suits, and Cali-
fornia settled in favor of challengers or lost five of these six. The sixth matter 
was dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claim, 
leaving plaintiffs to re-file the complaint.400 Comparing this record to four simi-
lar recent challenges in other states to sustainable energy regulation pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, three of the four either were settled in some manner fa-
vorable to challengers, or the state lost the decision. The fourth matter as well as 
one of the originally adjudicated matters on appeal are still pending.401  
When litigation was initiated under state law clams in seven significant re-
cent legal challenges, California either settled in favor of challengers or lost 
three of the five of these matters that have proceeded to a decision. On two Cali-
fornia prevailed, while two were sidetracked on procedural grounds without 
reaching the merits of the claim or are still pending a final decision.402 Com-
pared to four New York carbon control challenges based on state-law-based 
claims, one of the four was settled in favor of challengers, while three of the four 
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were dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the claims 
or are still awaiting resolution.403 
Employing regulation to change the pricing of commerce in electricity to 
encourage combined heat and power development, California went further than 
most states: California adopted a feed-in tariff for wholesale transactions in 
power, after having already been told by the courts and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) years before that it could not dictate above-
market prices that utilities must pay for wholesale power transactions404 and an-
other state was told by FERC that any such entered “contracts will be considered 
to be void ab initio.”405 When it did so again, in 2010, California was told again 
that the Constitution had not morphed into new form and it could not do so.406 
Vermont also imposed a feed-in tariff, and a challenge ensued.407 
The Constitution does  not accommodate  many  exceptions  where a state 
crosses the line to enact law beyond its own state jurisdiction over energy mat-
ters or discriminates against interstate commerce in other than the least burden-
some manner. The volume and record of challenges under federal law and the 
Constitution to state energy regulation is demonstrative of an emergence of legal 
issues to the forefront of our energy policy. The success of the challenges under 
both federal and state law, to date, is significant and ongoing. 
As a palliative measure if challenged, a state can unilaterally amend or alter 
its own statutes, as some states have done.408 The Constitution and federal law 
are not within state power to alter when a state is challenged on a violation re-
garding its energy policy. The irony is that every state could accomplish its ob-
jectives in ways that do not risk constitutional challenge.409 Not taking sound 
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legal advice on these issues can be costly to state citizens in both time and mon-
ey. Vermont regulation of energy resulted in that regulation being constitutional-
ly stricken and the plaintiff’s costs of suit ordered to be paid by the state of Ver-
mont and its citizens.410 It can also be costly in time to advancing sustainable 
energy development and climate control, as evidenced by the one-year delay in 
implementation of California’s entire Assembly Bill 32 program caused by a 
single lawsuit.411 
When a state repeatedly makes program choices and employs administra-
tive techniques that are successfully challenged as unconstitutional or in viola-
tion of law, it also alienates stakeholders in the community whose support and 
participation are necessary for a successful program addressing climate control 
and sustainable growth. For any discretionary program that expends resources, 
especially when other states are not making similar choices, making legally 
sound choices is important to maintain progress. Here, attention to basic consti-
tutional principles of governance matter. 
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